Curt Doolittle

Form: Excerpt

  • Current Western Institutional Trends explained

    [P]rivatization of commons in Western Europe and North America since the 1980s is but a reaction to a rapidly growing heterogeneous society; and a move by those who have*, to prohibit those who can’t**, from fraudulently obtaining rents.

    Similarly, creating compliance processes is making what used to be unnecessary to formulate and to structure, and implicit – knowledge of, and compliance with, core business-affecting legal procedures – explicit, so that the workforce created by heterogenification can either understand it, or be deprived of excuses in case they don’t.

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    * property, status, class
    ** obtain property, status, class

  • on Livy: III.16-18 by Coyle Neal III.16–18 In a sentiment that would later be ec

    http://wordpress.com/Discourses on Livy: III.16-18

    by Coyle Neal

    III.16–18

    In a sentiment that would later be echoed by Viscount James Bryce, the great observer of American politics, Machiavelli notes that

    It has always been, and will always be, that great and rare men are neglected in a republic in peaceful times. (III.16.1)

    Why is it, Viscount Bryce would ask four centuries later, that great men are not elected president? One reason Bryce gives is that they are simply not needed when things are going well. Machiavelli puts a darker spin on it: it’s not just that great men are neglected in times of peace and prosperity, they are actively disdained:

    For through the envy that the reputation their virtue has given them has brought with it, one finds very many citizens in such times who wish to be not their equals but their superiors. (III.16.1)

    It would be one thing if we merely ignored the virtuous when things were going well, but in a republic we actively do our best to tear them down to our level and even raise ourselves above them. (Here, Tocqueville rather than Bryce becomes Machiavelli’s echo.)

    Such is doubly damaging to a republic, first because of the injustice itself of ignoring great men’s advice—Machiavelli barely mentions this in passing, pointing to Thucydides and the famous debates between Nicias and Alcibiades over the Sicilian expedition as evidence. Greater damage, however, is done through the twofold effect this injustice has on those virtuous men:

    …in republics there is the disorder of giving little esteem to worthy men in quiet times. That thing makes them indignant in two modes: one, to see themselves lacking their rank; the other, to see unworthy men of less substance than they made partners and superiors to themselves. (III.16.2)

    At best this is, as already said, unjust; at worst it leads to conspiracy and revolution as the disgruntled great men become increasingly unhappy with their lot in life. And if at this point Machiavelli is beginning to sound a bit like Ayn Rand, his solution is certainly not for the capable to petulantly withdraw from society into self-indulgent isolation. Instead, Machiavelli says there are two options:

    Thinking over what could be the remedies, I find two of them: one, to maintain the citizens poor so that they cannot corrupt either themselves or others with riches and without virtue; the other, to be ordered for war so that one can always make war and always has need of reputed citizens. (III.16.2)

    In the first “remedy” to the problem facing republics, Machiavelli is simply arguing that an impoverished citizen body has bigger worries than fretting over its social standing relative to the virtuous and capable in society. A point with which few could reasonably disagree.

    I think the second remedy is much more interesting, as it draws on a longstanding interpretation of Roman history applied by the Romans themselves. Both the pagan historian Sallust and the Christian theologian Augustine argued that Rome began its slide away from whatever original virtue it had into decadence and, eventually, tyranny only when it defeated its last military enemy and had nothing left forcing it to be good. It seems to be generally agreed that hard times build national character, however little we actually want to face those hard times if given the choice. Machiavelli’s suggestion that a state ought to intentionally cultivate virtue by being perpetually at war strikes us as abhorrent, of course, even as we can recognize the reasoning behind it.

    (As a side note: this very problem becomes a theme in mid-twentieth century science fiction. How can we have a generation that matches the virtue of the World War II generation without replicating the Great Depression and World War II itself? How can such character be built without throwing the whole nation back into such desperate circumstances? Various answers are given in the works of Frank Herbert, Robert Heinlein, Orson Scott Card, and Cordwainer Smith, among others.)

    If a state decides to reconsider its capital punishment laws, the recently released prisoner who had wrongly been sitting on death row for the last two decades should probably not be put in charge of the reforms. At least, that’s Machiavelli’s advice:

    A republic ought to consider very much not putting someone over any important administration to whom any notable injury has been done by another. (III.17.1)

    While Machiavelli’s example of a general who decides he will either win glory or see himself revenged in the defeat of the state is probably a more extreme condition than most republics will regularly find themselves in, he still makes a good point. Before giving someone authority or high office, we should be sure that they have no secret agendas that involve revenge on their enemies and that they are not driven by bitterness against a system that has failed them. Machiavelli notes that this is a serious danger even in a strong and virtuous state, to say nothing of republics in decline. This leads him to the somewhat tangential conclusion (which is still clearly an important point, even if oddly placed in the discourse) that

    Because one cannot give a certain remedy for such disorders that arise in republics, it follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways. (III.17.1)

    Why it is that this particular unfixable danger leads to the conclusion that there can never be an eternal republic isn’t clear. Machiavelli has commented on many such dangers up until now, and he does not especially distinguish this one beyond saying it is a danger to strong and weak republics alike. In any case, it is worth noting that for Machiavelli there should be no hope of establishing a Hobbsean “mortal god” (more on that in a few months) which will survive whatever contingencies the world may throw at it. Our expectations for our republic should be kept reasonable, historical, and limited.

    The very greatest leaders are those who can correctly predict and interpret the actions and motives of the enemy. Machiavelli’s examples all involve the battlefield, but clearly there is application to every aspect of political life.

    Because such knowledge is difficult, he who employs himself so as to make conjectures about them deserves so much the more praise. (III.18.1)

    Careful consideration of the enemy and a correct understanding of his actions can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This is the beginning of a discussion on leadership that we will take up in the next post.

    Coyle Neal is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Baptist University in Bolivar, Missouri.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-02 05:08:00 UTC

  • THE PHYSICAL ALPHA Evolutionary preferences for physical formidability in leader

    THE PHYSICAL ALPHA

    Evolutionary preferences for physical formidability in leaders

    Abstract: This research uses evolutionary theory to evaluate followers’ preferences for physically formidable leaders and to identify conditions that stimulate those preferences. It employs a population-based survey experiment (N ≥ 760), which offers the advantages to internal validity of experiments and external validity of a highly heterogeneous sample drawn from a nationally representative subject pool. The theoretical argument proffered here is followers tend to prefer leaders with greater physical formidability because of evolutionary adaptations derived from humans’ violent ancestral environment. In this environment, individuals who allied with and ultimately followed physically powerful partners were more likely to acquire and retain important resources necessary for survival and reproduction because the presence of the physically powerful partner cued opponents to avoid a challenge for the resources or risk a costly confrontation. This argument suggests and the results indicate that threatening (war) and nonthreatening (peace, cooperation, and control) stimuli differentially motivate preferences for physically formidable leaders. In particular, the findings suggest threatening conditions lead to preferences for leaders with more powerful physical attributes, both anthropometric (i.e., weight, height, and body mass index) and perceptual (i.e., attributes of being “physically imposing or intimidating” and “physically strong”). Overall, this research offers a theoretical framework from which to understand this otherwise seemingly irrational phenomenon. Further, it advances the emerging but long-neglected investigation of biological effects on political behavior and has implications for a fundamental process in democratic society, leader selection.

    http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.2990/33_1_33

    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-27 04:57:00 UTC

  • THE MOST PROFOUND 1000 WORDS ON POLITICS AT THE MOMENT (worth repeating) All, Th

    THE MOST PROFOUND 1000 WORDS ON POLITICS AT THE MOMENT

    (worth repeating)

    All,

    Thank you for asking me to respond. I didn’t respond on LessWrong’s site because (honestly) I thought it was a rather pointless argument. But I’ll convert it from signaling (the author’s criticism and somewhat humorous demonstration of signaling), from moral to scientific language and I think it will be clearer:

    1) All radicals do not fit into the center of the distribution – the statement is tautological, not insightful.

    2) We all signal, and signaling is necessary for evolutionary reproductive selection.

    3) The presumption of not fitting into some locus of the median of the distribution is a democratic one – that we are equal rather than (as I argue) we constitute a division of cognitive labor: perception, evaluation, knowledge and advocacy. (humans divide cognition more so than other creatures because we specialize in cognition.)

    4) Our theories do tend to justify our social positions (signaling) but then, we would not have information necessary to theorize about any other set of interests, now would we?

    5) The origin of theories is irrelevant (justification is false), and therefore the question of a theory produced by any subset of a polity can be judged by only criticism – its irrelevant who comes up with a theory.

    The vast difference between pseudoscience and science in ethics, law, politics, and economics is captured those few words.

    Now, to state the positive version: the solution to the fallacy of the enlightenment hypothesis of equality of ability, interest, and value is captured in these additional points:

    6) economic velocity (wealth) is determined by the degree of suppression of parasitism (free riding/imposed costs). This eliminates transaction costs.

    7) central power originates to centralize parasitism and increase material costs, by suppressing local parasitism and transaction costs. Once centralized they can be incrementally eliminated. If and only if an institutional means of following rules can be used to replace personal judgement.

    8) The only means of producing institutional rules to replace personal judgement (provision of ‘decidability’) is in the independent, common, evolutionary law resting upon a prohibition on parasitism/free-riding/imposed costs (negatives), codified as property rights (positives): productive, warrantied, fully informed, voluntary transfer(exchange), free of negative externalities.

    9) Language evolved to justify (morality), negotiate (deceive), and rally and shame (gossip), and only tangentially and late to describe (truth). Truth as we understand it is an invention and an unnatural one – which is why it is unique to the west, and why it has taken philosophers so long to understand it. However, westerners evolved a military epistemology because they relied upon self-financing warriors voluntarily participating, as well as the jury and truth telling. (The marginal difference in intellectual ability apparently not common – they were all smart enough. and such testimony was in itself ‘training’.)

    10) We cannot expect or demand truth from people unless they know how to produce it. ie: Education in what I would consider the religion of the west: “the true, the moral and the beautiful”. So I consider this education ‘sacred’ not just utilitarian.

    11) We cannot demand truth and law from people unless it is not against their interests: ie: the only universal political system is Nationalism, because groups can act truthfully internally, truthfully externally, and can use trade negotiations to neutralized competitive differences. And with nationalism, individuals cannot escape paying the cost of transforming their own societies, and themselves, and laying the burden of doing so upon other societies.

    12) Commons are a profound competitive advantage. Territorial, institutional, normative, genetic, physical, and economic (industrial) commons are a profound advantage to any group. The west is the most successful producer of commons so it is even more important to the west. So we must provide a means of producing those commons. The difference between market for private goods and services (where competition in production is a good incentive) and corporate (public) goods, where we must prevent privatization of gains an socialization of losses, requires that we provide monopoly protection of those goods from consumption. But does not require that we provide monopoly contribution to them. Commons require only that the people willing to pay for them, do so. Otherwise there is no demonstrated preference for that commons. Insurance is a commons and I will leave that for another time. Return on investment (dividends) are the product of commons. I will leave that for another time as well. The central point is that we can produce a market for common goods using government just as we do in the market private goods. But that law and commons are two different things. and that there is no reason whatsoever, knowing how to construct the common law, that government should be capable of producing law. it cannot. Law is. It cannot be created. Only identified.

    (This is also probably the most profound 1000 words on politics that you will be able to find at this moment in time)

    #propertarianism

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-18 05:45:00 UTC

  • The New Reconstruction of British and North Sea History

    [O]ne of the great civilizations of human pre-history. A center not an outlier. Reincarnation. An underworld. Oak Trees Planted Upside down. The Hearth. Homes built around hearths. Stone circles built around homes.  Feats of public engineering. A bronze age industrial revolution. The intentional destruction of our Priest-Judges and our civilization by Rome. The consequent destruction of our entire european religion (civilization) by Justinian. There was no Celtic conquests. There were no anglo-saxon conquests. There were no Viking conquests. There was even limited norman conquest. We see cultural adoption of British civilization on the continent, then after conquest by Rome and the destruction fo the druids, adoption of roman status signals and culture. Then after the departure of Rome, the adoption of north sea Scandinavian signals and culture. Bede’s Justification of the Church and the Fabrication of Primitivism of the British peoples. It was a lie.

    We had liberty in pre-history: rule of law and an independent judiciary in prehistory. The north sea peoples were constantly trading and inbreeding. The use of flint was eliminated by the oversupply of bronze tools. We were cut off at the knees by Romans, not civilized by them. We were enslaved into hierarchy by the church, not civilized by it. Yet with the reintroduction of pagan thought (greek) we restored our civilization in but a few hundred years, and again produced an industrial revolution. As far as I can tell, we never developed centralized government and taxation, so we did not develop inventories and writing. That is because we never had to construct irrigation or armies. We would only have developed writing if we had expanded commerce sufficiently to require inventories and contracts. But we did not get the chance. Romans killed our civilization. Bede and the church lied to us to pretend they had civilized us. The Americans tried to restore our ancient civilization. But the Louisiana purchase and the failure to divide north and south into separate nations by aggressive conquest by the north, repeated the process. Knowledge is power. We can restore our northern European civilization. No state. Rule of Law. Professional, devoted, judiciary. Private property. Militia. Universal standing. And civic construction of commons. WATCH https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qZo0_YaBhc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vp1TpNzcXcY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQrWCEMO7mE

  • The New Reconstruction of British and North Sea History

    [O]ne of the great civilizations of human pre-history. A center not an outlier. Reincarnation. An underworld. Oak Trees Planted Upside down. The Hearth. Homes built around hearths. Stone circles built around homes.  Feats of public engineering. A bronze age industrial revolution. The intentional destruction of our Priest-Judges and our civilization by Rome. The consequent destruction of our entire european religion (civilization) by Justinian. There was no Celtic conquests. There were no anglo-saxon conquests. There were no Viking conquests. There was even limited norman conquest. We see cultural adoption of British civilization on the continent, then after conquest by Rome and the destruction fo the druids, adoption of roman status signals and culture. Then after the departure of Rome, the adoption of north sea Scandinavian signals and culture. Bede’s Justification of the Church and the Fabrication of Primitivism of the British peoples. It was a lie.

    We had liberty in pre-history: rule of law and an independent judiciary in prehistory. The north sea peoples were constantly trading and inbreeding. The use of flint was eliminated by the oversupply of bronze tools. We were cut off at the knees by Romans, not civilized by them. We were enslaved into hierarchy by the church, not civilized by it. Yet with the reintroduction of pagan thought (greek) we restored our civilization in but a few hundred years, and again produced an industrial revolution. As far as I can tell, we never developed centralized government and taxation, so we did not develop inventories and writing. That is because we never had to construct irrigation or armies. We would only have developed writing if we had expanded commerce sufficiently to require inventories and contracts. But we did not get the chance. Romans killed our civilization. Bede and the church lied to us to pretend they had civilized us. The Americans tried to restore our ancient civilization. But the Louisiana purchase and the failure to divide north and south into separate nations by aggressive conquest by the north, repeated the process. Knowledge is power. We can restore our northern European civilization. No state. Rule of Law. Professional, devoted, judiciary. Private property. Militia. Universal standing. And civic construction of commons. WATCH https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qZo0_YaBhc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vp1TpNzcXcY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQrWCEMO7mE

  • General George Doolittle, b. June 14, 1759, Wallingford, Conn., where his parent

    General George Doolittle, b. June 14, 1759, Wallingford, Conn., where his parents resided for a few years and then ret. to Middletown. He m. 1783, Grace Wetmore, b. Dec. 3, 1766, Middletown, Conn., dau of Capt. Amos Wetmore and Rachel Parsons.

    George Doolittle, at the age of seventeen enlisted , 1776, as a private in Capt. Churchill’s Co., Col. Comfort Sage’s Reg., Gen. Wadsworth’s Brigade, raised in June to reinforce Gen. Washington at N.Y., and which retreated Sept. 15, from the city; time expired Dec. 25, 1776. On Jan. 1, 1777, he enlisted in the company of Capt. David Humphrey, under Col. Return Jonathan Meigs; enlisted again April 7, 1777, for six weeks’ service at Peekskill. On May 1, 1778, he enlisted “for the war” in the 6th Reg. Conn. Line (Regulars), Col. Meigs, and served till 1783.

    In 1786 he followed his father-in-law to Whitestown and at the first town meeting, Apr. 7, 1789, he was chosen commissioner of highways. For many years he was supervisor. On Apr. 1, 1793, a meeting was held to organize a religious society and he was named on the committee. In 1800 the first brigade of militia of all the new part of New York was organized and he was commissioned Brigadier General, though others in that settlement had been commissioned officers in the Rev. Army. he was a mem. of the N.Y. Legislature, and served in the War of 1812. He was a ruling elder in the Presby. ch. He was stricken in the night with apoplexy and died Feb. 21, 1825. The widow d. Aug. 27, 1836. There were twelve children.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-05 14:10:00 UTC

  • Untitled

    http://www.panarchy.org/kohr/1941.eng.html

    Source date (UTC): 2015-04-23 15:28:00 UTC

  • ADVICE FOR NEW DRIVERS (from elsewhere) RUNNING WITH SCISSORS AND A BIG BAG OF C

    ADVICE FOR NEW DRIVERS

    (from elsewhere)

    RUNNING WITH SCISSORS AND A BIG BAG OF CONCRETE

    I rode a ran a lot, bicycled a lot, drove minibikes, and motorcycles. But when my mother taught me how to drive a manual truck in a school parking lot – even with all that experience – I was surprised at how different it was sitting on, and piloting, all that mass.

    The primary difference that I notice, between each increasingly massive vehicle (up to a B52 bomber, which starts slowly turning a few miles after you move the stick) is that you shift your perception out to the limit of your vision, and slowly pilot the car in an arc toward that limit of your vision.

    Most drivers start out trying to plan movements like they’re walking or riding a bicycle – thinking at ‘human scale’. As if we can turn, weave, stop, when we way a ton or two. It would be awesome if cars turned more slowly, for introductory drivers, so that they were FORCED to drive by slow correction of long arcs. Unfortunately cars are agile (and need to be for slow speeds). But basically the faster you go the longer the arc you have to aim at in the distance.

    Pick up something heavy, run with it as fast as you can, and then try to turn, and try to stop. Feel it. Now imagine you’re carrying twenty times your weight, and trying to turn or stop. The surface area of your foot is roughly equal to the surface area of a tire on the road. In optimum circumstances, the car has four feet touching the ground instead of two. But otherwise the car has the same problem that you do. Now, take the same heavy thing and try to make small adjustments in your course in order to reach the next curve that you can see out in the distance.

    ASIDE FROM MASS – THINK PARANOID

    The other things are (a) you are invisible to everyone else, always. (if you ride in a blind spot (behind to the left or right) you are asking to get hit. Even if you can see the driver’s eyes, it doesn’t mean he sees you. It means only that he might see you. (c) Other drivers don’t drive logically, they drive impulsively, intuitively, habitually, with the least intellectual effort, lowest concentration, and with their minds on something else. (b) If you can’t see into any space, it means something is there that’s trying to kill you.

    ASIDE FROM PARANOIA – THINK

    (c) You cannot ever really take your eyes off the road for longer than it takes you to blink. (d) It takes WAAAY longer to slow down and stop than you think, and so always obey 1 car length per 10 miles per hour of velocity no matter what. (e) passing people is the best way to get into an accident. (f) never hurry when driving. (g) Never try to optimize your drive time within the flow of traffic, only prior to a flow of traffic.

    SUMMARY

    Basically, drive completely paranoid, and in small movements of the wheel, targeting as far in the distance as you can ‘arc’, and don’t try to be cunning. The only smart driver is the one who leaves early enough that he doesn’t have to rush. Keep music and audio books in the car to entertain you.

    There… that’s my good deed for the day. lol

    Source date (UTC): 2015-04-12 03:37:00 UTC

  • HOW DO YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF (from elsewhere) I describe myself as any of the fo

    HOW DO YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF

    (from elsewhere)

    I describe myself as any of the following:

    – A Conservative Libertarian

    – A Classical Liberal Libertarian

    – An Aristocratic Libertarian

    – An advocate for aristocratic liberty

    – A Propertarian (in my technical sense of the term).

    Reasons:

    1) It is impossible to possess property rights in demonstrable fact, except in voluntary exchange of them in the form of reciprocal insurance.

    2) It is illogical to forgo aggression, violence, fraud, deceit, conspiracy, and free riding, unless one obtains the same promise to forgo those parasitic actions in exchange. Our original exchange was permission to participate in the market. At present, given the advent of generations of labor saving technology, combined with rapid reproduction by the lower classes, has led to an oversupply of labor with nothing to sell in the market, and therefore no incentives to forgo aggression, violence, fraud, deceit, conspiracy and free riding.

    3) It is illogical to abandon the production of commons when the western competitive advantage has been in the production of the commons made possible by our most important commons – the total prohibition on parasitic, and even unproductive actions.

    4) It is only possible to produce commons by prohibiting their privatization, or the free riding upon them.

    5) The classical liberal political model under an independent judiciary constructed a loose market for the facilitation of exchanges of benefits between classes by means of constructing commons. Our failure was in not adding a house of proletarians when we enfranchised them. And thereby allowing them to circumvent the common law. The collapse of the church, which had previously provided an independent taxation system, insurance, education and care-taking for the proletarians, exacerbated the problem of creating demand in the state. And the usurpation of moral argument by the academy, intellectuals and media in lieu of the church created malincentives for everyone. The ability to sell advertising on the back of distribution of the content that generated the greatest agitation, created yet another set of malincentives.

    6) The attempt by (profligate) jewish intellectuals (the cosmopolitans) to justify immigration in order to maintain their ‘separate-but-apart’ culture, and, for various other producers to obtain discounts by immigrating labor at the cost of: social norms, traditions, history, language, intergenerational conflict, political polarization, has been destructive not only to the rule of law, to truth telling, but to the vast consequences of that immigration. We were able to indoctrinate the wave through 1925 by 1960, but in no small part because of the militarism of the war. Conversely, the only honest non-parasitic exchange is to export capital to locations where there is excess labor, and pay the cost of adapting the local norms to commercial and libertarian ends, rather than forcing others to bear the cost of increased transaction costs in every walk of life, and the consequential destruction of the civic society, liberty and truth telling. In other words, the argument to free immigration is an act of fraud in an attempt to privatize the gains produced by the commons.

    7) The common law, truth telling, and the jury (of which the classical liberal model of government is an evolution) are responsible for western exceptionalism. The reason being that prohibitions on parasitism (involuntary transfer of property en toto – and in the extreme, the prohibition on profiting from non production), (a) deprive people of all possible means of sustenance other than productive participation in the market, and (b) produce what we call ‘trust’ (reduction of transaction costs), (c) allow the rapid identification of new prohibitions on parasitism BEFORE such behavior can develop into a norm, and institutionalize even the subtle parasitism of rent seeking or free riding.

    So neither Hayek nor Hoppe solves the problem of identifying causality. Of the two, Hoppe gives us the full transformation of social science into statements of property rights, but he is misled by his heritage (as well all are), his education (as we all are) and likely by his friendships (as we all are), by incorrectly identifying property as the object of consideration, instead of an institution that suppresses parasitism, and forces all of us into productive labors.

    It is irrational – at least for the strong – to abandon violence, theft, fraud, fraud by omission, deceit, theft by indirection, free riding, socialization of losses, privatization of commons, conspiracy, and outright conquest, unless others grant us the same. When the weak ask the same, they are merely seeking to preserve means of theft by the only means available to them anyway. A hollow exchange if there ever was one.

    The reason man developed cooperation was that it is a multiplier on productivity that is unmatched in living organisms. The problem with cooperation is that it invites parasitism in all its forms. The reason we have moral intuitions is that evolution needed to guarantee that we punish free riders (parasites) even at high cost (altruistic punishment).

    Austrian economics is best understood as a research program into the institutions by which we improve voluntary exchanges. Whereas mainstream economics is best understood as the means by which we maximize consumption regardless of individual volition. The Austrian method makes use of all available information in society. The democratic and mainstream economic method does not. It aggregates this only in a single measure: consumption. And the consequence is rapid expansion of the population. So we practice moral economics and the mainstream practices immoral economics.

    But in this same light, the abandonment of the means of producing commons, when commons are one’s greatest competitive advantage is merely an admission of failure to solve the intellectual challenge of recreating a market for commons equal in productivity to the market for private goods and services.

    Either that or it is something much worse: yet another version of marxism, socialism, neo-conservatism: elaborate means of justifying parasitism that our civilization was more successful than any other in eradicating.

    Group evolutionary strategies matter. Liberty is but one. But do we mean aristocratic liberty, or libertinism?

    Western liberty is inseparable from the requirement for truth telling. And the Rothbardian Hoppeian model is specifically (conveniently) designed to preserve the utility of deceit and conspiracy, yet prohibit retaliation for deceit and conspiracy. Whereas for law to provide sufficient means of resolving conflict, we must resolve all possible sources of conflict. Otherwise, demand for the state fills what the does not.

    The levant remains a low trust society because it practices low trust property rights. The west evolved a high trust and wealthy society because it practices high trust property rights. The levant remains a center for high demand for authoritarian government. Because the common law cannot function where people are so comfortable and free to engage in deceit.

    The rule of law, the common law (organic poly-centric), strictly (Operationally) constructed, the jury, and the decidability of property-en-toto: the prohibition on all non-productive actions that create demand for retaliation. A market for the commons that divides individuals into classes (and genders) based upon the categories (scale) of property under their control – wherein all contracts can be negotiated, not monopolies imposed.

    It’s not complicated. Or at least, it isn’t once you know it.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-04-11 04:07:00 UTC