[Y]ou can’t reason with a libertarian who relies upon moral intuition any more than you can reason with a progressive who relies upon moral intuition. So, it’s pretty clear to me today, that libertarians are as morally blind (or in Haidt’s terms ‘tasteless’) as progressives are (albeit at a different part of the spectrum), and that the only conservatives can carry on a rational moral discussion – because only conservatives are not affected by large moral blind spots. The data says it. But I just experienced it first hand. And I hate what it means. It means that libertarians are just as irrational and impenetrable as progressives. That doesn’t mean that libertarians haven’t solved the problem of formal institutions. They have. (Hoppe has.) But it means that except as a sort of minority conducting intellectual experiments, libertarians are useless for the purpose of discussing political solutions. They’re by definition ‘immoral’. Or perhaps a form of moral color-blindness in which the majority of the spectrum is invisible to them. I’m a conservative libertarian. I place a premium on liberty and discount all the other moral values. That’s the definition of the moral intuitions of a libertarian. But that PERSONAL intuition and personal objective, is different from my understanding of POLITICS as a set of institutions that allow heterogeneous peoples to cooperate on means even if they possess competing ends. (Give the citizenry a circus and let their actions sort them out.) ANALOGY: 1) RED : PROGRESSIVISM – Sees only red. (Harm/Care : the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children.) 2) BLUE : CONSERVATISM – Sees red, blue and yellow (Harm/Care, Proportionality, Authority/Hierarchy/Duty, Loyalty, Purity/Sanctity, Liberty/Oppression) 3) GREEN : LIBERTARIANISM – Sees only green (Liberty/Oppression : ) – Libertarians are “Red/Blue color blind.” – Progressives are “Green/Blue color blind.” – Conservatives are not color blind at all. Just how it is. YOU CAN”T REASON WITH A LIBERTARIAN EITHER [Y]ou can’t actually reason with a libertarian who relies upon moral intuition. It’s as irrational as trying to reason with a progressive who relies upon moral intuition. Both just justify their positions. You can reason to a conservative, or conservative libertarian, *EVEN IF* they rely on moral intuition. Because they aren’t morally blind to any part of the spectrum. And here I keep thinking (stupidly) that because I am not morally blind, even though I place a premium on liberty, and because I understand the RESULT of libertarian moral blindness: the reduction of all rights to property rights – that other libertarians will of course be as rational as I am. But that’s not true. I am literally talking to people who are for all intents and purposes, physically incapable of moral discourse, just as a color blind person is physically incapable of aesthetic discourse on colors that he cannot see. (Or the disability called “Ageusia” which prohibits taste.) THE INTELLECTUAL LIMIT [T]here is some point at which individuals abandon intuitionism (feelings) and resort to either rationalism (rules), or ratio-empirical science ( outcomes) for their epistemic judgements. The only libertarians that one can speak to rationally about morality are those that have abandoned intuitionism. And since it APPEARS to me that rationalism is just a form of justification, then further it appears that only those who adopt the ratio-scientific level of thought, abandon both intuition and justification, are capable of discourse. That means that we are very limited in the number those people who possess the capacity for rational discourse on ethics and politics. And that since only conservatives are not morally spectrum blind, that it is only conservatives who can rationally discuss these issues EVEN IF they are relegated only to intuition. THE TRIANGLE IS INVERTED Conservatives form the base of an inverted pyramid. Progressives and Libertarians are specialized variants of human. Progressives are ‘excessively female’ and libertarians ‘excessively male’. (I think some conservatives specialize in being ‘warriors’ but they’re indistinguishable because they have identical moral intuitions.) Where progressive, conservative and libertarian refer to moral intuitions. BUGS [T]he more I work on this problem the more I see humans of different moral persuasions just like specialized forms of ants. ‘Cause pretty much, that’s what we are.
Form: Critique
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Stakes In The Heart of Rothbardian Vampires
(status) (against walking-dead libertarianism) [O]K. So praxeology is dead. I’m done with that. Rothbardian ethics and the NAP are dead. I’m done with that. Intersubjectively verifiable private property as insufficient is done. Although I have a long post I’m almost done with on it. I’m pretty much there on performative truth (testimony). The scientific method as a moral constraint under performative truth. And platonism, obscurantism, pseUdoscIence, mysticism, and ‘non-construction’ an non-operational language as immoral AND THEREFORE NOT TRUE. So I’m pretty close on Moral Realism. I have a lot of work on formal grammar and logic of cooperation but that’s drudgery that I think is for the appendix. Because no matter where else I put it in the chapter order it’s a departure from the argument. I still have the problem of stating the argument for the necessary scope of common law as one of eliminating demand for the state, rather than justifying liberty. I am pretty close but I need to work on the clarity of that argument a bit more. That will take me a couple of weeks – albeit I’ll be traveling so I won’t get as much done. It’s been a very fruitful year. Really.
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Stakes In The Heart of Rothbardian Vampires
(status) (against walking-dead libertarianism) [O]K. So praxeology is dead. I’m done with that. Rothbardian ethics and the NAP are dead. I’m done with that. Intersubjectively verifiable private property as insufficient is done. Although I have a long post I’m almost done with on it. I’m pretty much there on performative truth (testimony). The scientific method as a moral constraint under performative truth. And platonism, obscurantism, pseUdoscIence, mysticism, and ‘non-construction’ an non-operational language as immoral AND THEREFORE NOT TRUE. So I’m pretty close on Moral Realism. I have a lot of work on formal grammar and logic of cooperation but that’s drudgery that I think is for the appendix. Because no matter where else I put it in the chapter order it’s a departure from the argument. I still have the problem of stating the argument for the necessary scope of common law as one of eliminating demand for the state, rather than justifying liberty. I am pretty close but I need to work on the clarity of that argument a bit more. That will take me a couple of weeks – albeit I’ll be traveling so I won’t get as much done. It’s been a very fruitful year. Really.
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I Didn't Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality
[B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.
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I Didn’t Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality
[B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.
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I Didn't Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality
[B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.
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I Didn’t Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality
[B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.
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Q: "Curt, Why Do You Want To Undermine Praxeology"
Q: “CURT, WHY DO YOU WANT TO UNDERMINE PRAXEOLOGY?” A: For a host of reasons. 1) Because praxeology, pseudoscience that it is, when we use it, harms the cause of liberty, by justifiably furthering the perception of libertarians as tinfoil-hat wearing social incompetents, engaged in justification, hero-worshipping and hermeneutic interpretation, in a secular version of theological analysis of scripture and the blind belief in prophets, differing only in use of platonic obscurantism rather than anthropomorphic supernatural language. (That’s a choice, and quotable paragraph.) 2) Because praxeology’s claims are patently false (which I’ve addressed elsewhere at length). Furthermore it is false to state that economics is an axiomatic rather than theoretic discipline, because demonstrably it has not been, and logically it cannot be. (Although I suppose I will have to continue to work to defeat ideological praxeology for the rest of my lifetime. ) 3) Because philosophy is indeed missing a solution to, and logic of, the problem of cooperation that we call ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, that renders commensurable and intelligible the findings of the physical sciences, economic history, and narrative history. Without this uniform system of descriptive ethics it is not possible to rationally construct institutional solutions to the persistent problem of increasing levels of cooperation among peoples with disparate means and ends. 4) Because it is possible to restate libertarian, anarcho-capitalist arguments by Hoppe in ratio-scientific language such that libertarian arguments can be conducted by rational and empirical means as a viable alternative to public choice theory and social democracy. 5) Because I care about actually winning, and obtaining liberty for myself, my progeny, and my people, rather than just making myself feel morally justified as a purely spiritual and psychological form of self gratification. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Juan Fernando Carpio Tobar-Subia, Francesco Principi, Alejandro Veintimilla and 8 others like this. Curt Doolittle I’m trying to save the philosophy of liberty. That requires slaying the sacred cows of rationalism, praxeology and rothbardian ethics. I don’t see anyone else standing in line to further Hoppe’s work. (I am advancing Hoppe. Despite his reliance on Rationalism, Praxeology, Rothbardianism, and Argumentation. As Stephan Kinsella said, Hoppe pretty much got it right. The problem is converting hoppe’s correct solutions to liberty from pseudoscientific rationalism to ratio-scientific arguments, and restoring liberty to aristocracy where it came from – rather than its current, laughable, cosmopolitain, ghetto costume.) Ayelam Valentine Agaliba you are liable to upset many cultists. you will also need to address the truth as consensus nonsense Ayelam Valentine Agaliba danny on the CR page has written a pretty comprehensive rebuttal of argumentation ethics, if you ask him he might send a copy on his recent stuff Curt Doolittle Val, Thanks I just went through it. It’s OK. I don’t think it’s any better than Long’s or Murphy’s. And you know, I tend to rely on scientific arguments that are reducible to actions. In the case of argumentation, the available actions at any given point of interaction consist of: 0) violence/theft/destruction; 1) ignorance/avoidance/rejection/boycott; 2) deception/stalling/debate/enticement/verbal coercion; 3) unethical exchange, immoral exchange, and fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange. I can’t confirm that in any interaction, anyone attributes ownership of himself to another, only that each party attaches different costs of the different actions available as listed above. And that parties act according to to the costs. Unless one has an asymmetry of power, cooperation is less costly and more rewarding over the long term. So we choose it. As such most human political objectives seek to raise the cost of any action other than cooperation, such that only cooperation is cost effective. In my work I have tried to show that high trust societies raise all costs such that all choices other than fully informed and warrantied voluntary exchange are intolerable. And as far as I know that is all that we can say. What we can say about argumentation, is that if all costs other than voluntary exchange are higher than voluntary exchange, that for all intents and purposes, one treats the other as sovereign over himself and his property, because it is cost effective to do so. From that position it is possible to deduce all that hoppe has deduced. Although, from what I understand, (I am not certain) he justified his solutions with argumentation rather than deduced his solutions from argumentation. But that is second hand information and I don’t really know. Curt Peter Boettke Curt — praxeology is not unscientific, certain bad practitioners give it a bad name. So you don’t want to undermine the systematic study of purposive human action, you want to undermine bad practitioners of that science. Curt Doolittle @Peter Boettke. Bad practitioners Peter. But with a few qualifications. TINFOIL HATS I have one of the same basic objectives that your team at GMU does regarding the ‘brand name’ of liberty and libertarianism. Albeit I’m going about it under the assumption that public choice theory is inferior to private ownership of institutions (limited monarchy) and the civic society. So I am trying to restore legitimacy to libertarianism (Hoppe’s institutions) by restating it in ratio-scientific terms rather than as it stands in continental and cosmopolitan rationalism. My hope is to reform the private government arguments such that the pervasive ‘tinfoil hat’ arguments are not only abandoned, but easily defeated. SCIENCE? On the other hand, when you say ‘the study of purposeful human action” I think you mean the ratio-empirical study of human action which in turn can be reduced to a set of general purpose rules (theories) like any other discipline produces. But in the continental and cosmopolitan rationalist world of Rothbardians (and Hoppeians), economics is a purely deductive discipline and empirical economics (or any other empirical study) has no standing – in no small part because of the purported absence of constant relations. Now technically speaking, a science requires the use of the scientific method, and its theories produce predictable outcomes. A pseudoscience does not follow the scientific method yet claims it is a science. Furthermore, theoretical systems consist of statements that are bounded by correspondence with reality. Axiomatic systems are not. They are not bounded by reality. As such they are logics not sciences. We may use logics as instrumentation in science, but since logics are not bounded by reality they are not ‘scientific’ because they do not adhere to the scientific method whose purpose is to ensure that our statements are bounded by reality. BROADER ISSUE: ETHICAL REALISM My broader objectives is the restatement of what we call praxeology as a formal logic of cooperation, bounded by universal moral rules, which I see as a further extension of Ostom’s institutional work by combining it with Haidt’s research on morality. So my emphasis on ethics (particularly operational language, and constructivism) is toward this end. Thanks for the note. Always have been a fan. Curt. Alberto Dietz Hi, Curt: Is there any truly successful refutation of Hoppe? Curt Doolittle Alberto. Um.. I’m going to tease you and say that refuting Hoppe means that ‘Hoppe does not exist?’ One can criticize hoppe’s Argumentation ethic. One can criticize his rationalism, anti-empiricism and (quite differently from Boettke) his take on Praxeology. One can criticize his take on ethics. One can criticize his critique of public vs private government. One can criticize his solutions to the problem of formal institutions. I think the first two have been pretty successfully attacked (Long, Murphy and others). And I think the next three are pretty successfullly supported. I try to improve his ethics for very specific reasons (reducing demand for the state). But otherwise it’s pretty solid argument. I mean. I like to put a fork in rationalism wherever I can find it, but I still think Hoppe solved the problem of formal institutions (if not ethics and law).
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Q: “Curt, Why Do You Want To Undermine Praxeology”
Q: “CURT, WHY DO YOU WANT TO UNDERMINE PRAXEOLOGY?” A: For a host of reasons. 1) Because praxeology, pseudoscience that it is, when we use it, harms the cause of liberty, by justifiably furthering the perception of libertarians as tinfoil-hat wearing social incompetents, engaged in justification, hero-worshipping and hermeneutic interpretation, in a secular version of theological analysis of scripture and the blind belief in prophets, differing only in use of platonic obscurantism rather than anthropomorphic supernatural language. (That’s a choice, and quotable paragraph.) 2) Because praxeology’s claims are patently false (which I’ve addressed elsewhere at length). Furthermore it is false to state that economics is an axiomatic rather than theoretic discipline, because demonstrably it has not been, and logically it cannot be. (Although I suppose I will have to continue to work to defeat ideological praxeology for the rest of my lifetime. ) 3) Because philosophy is indeed missing a solution to, and logic of, the problem of cooperation that we call ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, that renders commensurable and intelligible the findings of the physical sciences, economic history, and narrative history. Without this uniform system of descriptive ethics it is not possible to rationally construct institutional solutions to the persistent problem of increasing levels of cooperation among peoples with disparate means and ends. 4) Because it is possible to restate libertarian, anarcho-capitalist arguments by Hoppe in ratio-scientific language such that libertarian arguments can be conducted by rational and empirical means as a viable alternative to public choice theory and social democracy. 5) Because I care about actually winning, and obtaining liberty for myself, my progeny, and my people, rather than just making myself feel morally justified as a purely spiritual and psychological form of self gratification. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Juan Fernando Carpio Tobar-Subia, Francesco Principi, Alejandro Veintimilla and 8 others like this. Curt Doolittle I’m trying to save the philosophy of liberty. That requires slaying the sacred cows of rationalism, praxeology and rothbardian ethics. I don’t see anyone else standing in line to further Hoppe’s work. (I am advancing Hoppe. Despite his reliance on Rationalism, Praxeology, Rothbardianism, and Argumentation. As Stephan Kinsella said, Hoppe pretty much got it right. The problem is converting hoppe’s correct solutions to liberty from pseudoscientific rationalism to ratio-scientific arguments, and restoring liberty to aristocracy where it came from – rather than its current, laughable, cosmopolitain, ghetto costume.) Ayelam Valentine Agaliba you are liable to upset many cultists. you will also need to address the truth as consensus nonsense Ayelam Valentine Agaliba danny on the CR page has written a pretty comprehensive rebuttal of argumentation ethics, if you ask him he might send a copy on his recent stuff Curt Doolittle Val, Thanks I just went through it. It’s OK. I don’t think it’s any better than Long’s or Murphy’s. And you know, I tend to rely on scientific arguments that are reducible to actions. In the case of argumentation, the available actions at any given point of interaction consist of: 0) violence/theft/destruction; 1) ignorance/avoidance/rejection/boycott; 2) deception/stalling/debate/enticement/verbal coercion; 3) unethical exchange, immoral exchange, and fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange. I can’t confirm that in any interaction, anyone attributes ownership of himself to another, only that each party attaches different costs of the different actions available as listed above. And that parties act according to to the costs. Unless one has an asymmetry of power, cooperation is less costly and more rewarding over the long term. So we choose it. As such most human political objectives seek to raise the cost of any action other than cooperation, such that only cooperation is cost effective. In my work I have tried to show that high trust societies raise all costs such that all choices other than fully informed and warrantied voluntary exchange are intolerable. And as far as I know that is all that we can say. What we can say about argumentation, is that if all costs other than voluntary exchange are higher than voluntary exchange, that for all intents and purposes, one treats the other as sovereign over himself and his property, because it is cost effective to do so. From that position it is possible to deduce all that hoppe has deduced. Although, from what I understand, (I am not certain) he justified his solutions with argumentation rather than deduced his solutions from argumentation. But that is second hand information and I don’t really know. Curt Peter Boettke Curt — praxeology is not unscientific, certain bad practitioners give it a bad name. So you don’t want to undermine the systematic study of purposive human action, you want to undermine bad practitioners of that science. Curt Doolittle @Peter Boettke. Bad practitioners Peter. But with a few qualifications. TINFOIL HATS I have one of the same basic objectives that your team at GMU does regarding the ‘brand name’ of liberty and libertarianism. Albeit I’m going about it under the assumption that public choice theory is inferior to private ownership of institutions (limited monarchy) and the civic society. So I am trying to restore legitimacy to libertarianism (Hoppe’s institutions) by restating it in ratio-scientific terms rather than as it stands in continental and cosmopolitan rationalism. My hope is to reform the private government arguments such that the pervasive ‘tinfoil hat’ arguments are not only abandoned, but easily defeated. SCIENCE? On the other hand, when you say ‘the study of purposeful human action” I think you mean the ratio-empirical study of human action which in turn can be reduced to a set of general purpose rules (theories) like any other discipline produces. But in the continental and cosmopolitan rationalist world of Rothbardians (and Hoppeians), economics is a purely deductive discipline and empirical economics (or any other empirical study) has no standing – in no small part because of the purported absence of constant relations. Now technically speaking, a science requires the use of the scientific method, and its theories produce predictable outcomes. A pseudoscience does not follow the scientific method yet claims it is a science. Furthermore, theoretical systems consist of statements that are bounded by correspondence with reality. Axiomatic systems are not. They are not bounded by reality. As such they are logics not sciences. We may use logics as instrumentation in science, but since logics are not bounded by reality they are not ‘scientific’ because they do not adhere to the scientific method whose purpose is to ensure that our statements are bounded by reality. BROADER ISSUE: ETHICAL REALISM My broader objectives is the restatement of what we call praxeology as a formal logic of cooperation, bounded by universal moral rules, which I see as a further extension of Ostom’s institutional work by combining it with Haidt’s research on morality. So my emphasis on ethics (particularly operational language, and constructivism) is toward this end. Thanks for the note. Always have been a fan. Curt. Alberto Dietz Hi, Curt: Is there any truly successful refutation of Hoppe? Curt Doolittle Alberto. Um.. I’m going to tease you and say that refuting Hoppe means that ‘Hoppe does not exist?’ One can criticize hoppe’s Argumentation ethic. One can criticize his rationalism, anti-empiricism and (quite differently from Boettke) his take on Praxeology. One can criticize his take on ethics. One can criticize his critique of public vs private government. One can criticize his solutions to the problem of formal institutions. I think the first two have been pretty successfully attacked (Long, Murphy and others). And I think the next three are pretty successfullly supported. I try to improve his ethics for very specific reasons (reducing demand for the state). But otherwise it’s pretty solid argument. I mean. I like to put a fork in rationalism wherever I can find it, but I still think Hoppe solved the problem of formal institutions (if not ethics and law).
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Q: "Curt, Why Do You Want To Undermine Praxeology"
Q: “CURT, WHY DO YOU WANT TO UNDERMINE PRAXEOLOGY?” A: For a host of reasons. 1) Because praxeology, pseudoscience that it is, when we use it, harms the cause of liberty, by justifiably furthering the perception of libertarians as tinfoil-hat wearing social incompetents, engaged in justification, hero-worshipping and hermeneutic interpretation, in a secular version of theological analysis of scripture and the blind belief in prophets, differing only in use of platonic obscurantism rather than anthropomorphic supernatural language. (That’s a choice, and quotable paragraph.) 2) Because praxeology’s claims are patently false (which I’ve addressed elsewhere at length). Furthermore it is false to state that economics is an axiomatic rather than theoretic discipline, because demonstrably it has not been, and logically it cannot be. (Although I suppose I will have to continue to work to defeat ideological praxeology for the rest of my lifetime. ) 3) Because philosophy is indeed missing a solution to, and logic of, the problem of cooperation that we call ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, that renders commensurable and intelligible the findings of the physical sciences, economic history, and narrative history. Without this uniform system of descriptive ethics it is not possible to rationally construct institutional solutions to the persistent problem of increasing levels of cooperation among peoples with disparate means and ends. 4) Because it is possible to restate libertarian, anarcho-capitalist arguments by Hoppe in ratio-scientific language such that libertarian arguments can be conducted by rational and empirical means as a viable alternative to public choice theory and social democracy. 5) Because I care about actually winning, and obtaining liberty for myself, my progeny, and my people, rather than just making myself feel morally justified as a purely spiritual and psychological form of self gratification. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev
COMMENTS Juan Fernando Carpio Tobar-Subia, Francesco Principi, Alejandro Veintimilla and 8 others like this. Curt Doolittle I’m trying to save the philosophy of liberty. That requires slaying the sacred cows of rationalism, praxeology and rothbardian ethics. I don’t see anyone else standing in line to further Hoppe’s work. (I am advancing Hoppe. Despite his reliance on Rationalism, Praxeology, Rothbardianism, and Argumentation. As Stephan Kinsella said, Hoppe pretty much got it right. The problem is converting hoppe’s correct solutions to liberty from pseudoscientific rationalism to ratio-scientific arguments, and restoring liberty to aristocracy where it came from – rather than its current, laughable, cosmopolitain, ghetto costume.) Ayelam Valentine Agaliba you are liable to upset many cultists. you will also need to address the truth as consensus nonsense Ayelam Valentine Agaliba danny on the CR page has written a pretty comprehensive rebuttal of argumentation ethics, if you ask him he might send a copy on his recent stuff Curt Doolittle Val, Thanks I just went through it. It’s OK. I don’t think it’s any better than Long’s or Murphy’s. And you know, I tend to rely on scientific arguments that are reducible to actions. In the case of argumentation, the available actions at any given point of interaction consist of: 0) violence/theft/destruction; 1) ignorance/avoidance/rejection/boycott; 2) deception/stalling/debate/enticement/verbal coercion; 3) unethical exchange, immoral exchange, and fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange. I can’t confirm that in any interaction, anyone attributes ownership of himself to another, only that each party attaches different costs of the different actions available as listed above. And that parties act according to to the costs. Unless one has an asymmetry of power, cooperation is less costly and more rewarding over the long term. So we choose it. As such most human political objectives seek to raise the cost of any action other than cooperation, such that only cooperation is cost effective. In my work I have tried to show that high trust societies raise all costs such that all choices other than fully informed and warrantied voluntary exchange are intolerable. And as far as I know that is all that we can say. What we can say about argumentation, is that if all costs other than voluntary exchange are higher than voluntary exchange, that for all intents and purposes, one treats the other as sovereign over himself and his property, because it is cost effective to do so. From that position it is possible to deduce all that hoppe has deduced. Although, from what I understand, (I am not certain) he justified his solutions with argumentation rather than deduced his solutions from argumentation. But that is second hand information and I don’t really know. Curt Peter Boettke Curt — praxeology is not unscientific, certain bad practitioners give it a bad name. So you don’t want to undermine the systematic study of purposive human action, you want to undermine bad practitioners of that science. Curt Doolittle @Peter Boettke. Bad practitioners Peter. But with a few qualifications. TINFOIL HATS I have one of the same basic objectives that your team at GMU does regarding the ‘brand name’ of liberty and libertarianism. Albeit I’m going about it under the assumption that public choice theory is inferior to private ownership of institutions (limited monarchy) and the civic society. So I am trying to restore legitimacy to libertarianism (Hoppe’s institutions) by restating it in ratio-scientific terms rather than as it stands in continental and cosmopolitan rationalism. My hope is to reform the private government arguments such that the pervasive ‘tinfoil hat’ arguments are not only abandoned, but easily defeated. SCIENCE? On the other hand, when you say ‘the study of purposeful human action” I think you mean the ratio-empirical study of human action which in turn can be reduced to a set of general purpose rules (theories) like any other discipline produces. But in the continental and cosmopolitan rationalist world of Rothbardians (and Hoppeians), economics is a purely deductive discipline and empirical economics (or any other empirical study) has no standing – in no small part because of the purported absence of constant relations. Now technically speaking, a science requires the use of the scientific method, and its theories produce predictable outcomes. A pseudoscience does not follow the scientific method yet claims it is a science. Furthermore, theoretical systems consist of statements that are bounded by correspondence with reality. Axiomatic systems are not. They are not bounded by reality. As such they are logics not sciences. We may use logics as instrumentation in science, but since logics are not bounded by reality they are not ‘scientific’ because they do not adhere to the scientific method whose purpose is to ensure that our statements are bounded by reality. BROADER ISSUE: ETHICAL REALISM My broader objectives is the restatement of what we call praxeology as a formal logic of cooperation, bounded by universal moral rules, which I see as a further extension of Ostom’s institutional work by combining it with Haidt’s research on morality. So my emphasis on ethics (particularly operational language, and constructivism) is toward this end. Thanks for the note. Always have been a fan. Curt. Alberto Dietz Hi, Curt: Is there any truly successful refutation of Hoppe? Curt Doolittle Alberto. Um.. I’m going to tease you and say that refuting Hoppe means that ‘Hoppe does not exist?’ One can criticize hoppe’s Argumentation ethic. One can criticize his rationalism, anti-empiricism and (quite differently from Boettke) his take on Praxeology. One can criticize his take on ethics. One can criticize his critique of public vs private government. One can criticize his solutions to the problem of formal institutions. I think the first two have been pretty successfully attacked (Long, Murphy and others). And I think the next three are pretty successfullly supported. I try to improve his ethics for very specific reasons (reducing demand for the state). But otherwise it’s pretty solid argument. I mean. I like to put a fork in rationalism wherever I can find it, but I still think Hoppe solved the problem of formal institutions (if not ethics and law).