Category: Science, Physics, and Philosophy of Science

  • MATH: THE LANGLANDS PROGRAM (getting closer) OK. Gotta say. This is a bit on the

    http://publications.ias.edu/rpl/MORE MATH: THE LANGLANDS PROGRAM

    (getting closer)

    OK. Gotta say. This is a bit on the hard side. Most philosophy is nonsense, so it’s a matter of just sifting through it for a few fragments of gold. And I think I get number theory as well or better than anyone else. It LOOKS to me that I understand it correctly, given that Turing was so clear at operationalizing and demystifying math. (and Petzold helped too. And for me at least, not to forget Poincaré and Mandelbrot.) But the number of terms I have to learn here is just overtaxing my short term memory and I’ll probably have to write my own glossary just to make sure that I actually understand it all.

    Anyway, I don’t really have to understand or work on the mathematical problem – and I wouldnt be good at it. (Actually it’s like crack for nerds, and I’m afraid of being addicted to it.) I do have to understand the relevant language well enough that I can address mathematical platonism thoroughly.

    Work, work, work…. lol

    http://publications.ias.edu/rpl/

    Arthur, James (2003), “The principle of functoriality”, American Mathematical Society. Bulletin. New Series 40 (1): 39–53,

    Bernstein, J.; Gelbart, S. (2003), An Introduction to the Langlands Program, Boston: Birkhäuser

    Gelbart, Stephen (1984), “An elementary introduction to the Langlands program”, American Mathematical Society. Bulletin. New Series 10 (2): 177–219,

    Frenkel, Edward (2005). “Lectures on the Langlands Program and Conformal Field Theory”

    Gelfand, I. M. (1963), “Automorphic functions and the theory of representations”, Proc. Internat. Congr. Mathematicians (Stockholm, 1962), Djursholm: Inst. Mittag-Leffler, pp. 74–85

    Harris, Michael; Taylor, Richard (2001), The geometry and cohomology of some simple Shimura varieties, Annals of Mathematics Studies 151, Princeton University Press

    Henniart, Guy (2000), “Une preuve simple des conjectures de Langlands pour GL(n) sur un corps p-adique”, Inventiones Mathematicae 139 (2): 439–455,

    Kutzko, Philip (1980), “The Langlands Conjecture for Gl2 of a Local Field”, Annals of Mathematics 112 (2): 381–412,

    Langlands, Robert (1967), Letter to Prof. Weil

    Langlands, R. P. (1970), “Problems in the theory of automorphic forms”, Lectures in modern analysis and applications, III, Lecture Notes in Math 170, Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 18–61

    Laumon, G.; Rapoport, M.; Stuhler, U. (1993), “D-elliptic sheaves and the Langlands correspondence”, Inventiones Mathematicae 113 (2): 217–338,


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-09 04:19:00 UTC

  • MEDIA ARE MOSTLY IN STUPID MODE” (judith curry) “In a word. No.”

    http://judithcurry.com/2014/01/07/is-global-warming-causing-the-polar-vortex/”THE MEDIA ARE MOSTLY IN STUPID MODE”

    (judith curry)

    “In a word. No.”


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 19:17:00 UTC

  • THE JOY OF MATH (rumination) My long term business partner Jim was a math guy. W

    THE JOY OF MATH

    (rumination)

    My long term business partner Jim was a math guy. Worked at JPL. That kind of thing. Loves numbers the way I love philosophy.

    Math is an endlessly fascinating puzzle. I prefer to solve problems instead of puzzles. In fact, because of a deliberate choice in college, I intentionally eschewed all puzzles as ‘character flaws’.

    The difference between puzzles and problems is whether the outcome causes material benefit or harm in real time. And that’s partly because you know that puzzles are solvable, and that problems often are not. So you know if you stick with a puzzle it can be solved. But with a problem, you are working against a clock that will run out, and you don’t know in advance that it can be solved.

    But that that doesn’t mean that I’m not easily seduced by puzzles. A video game, or a computer game, is a puzzle, not a problem. Puzzles are entertaining.

    Jim used to say that he couldn’t get too interested in math because it was just such an entertaining puzzle, but it didn’t produce anything. And in the end it wasn’t a good use of his time.

    It’s like crack. Puzzles really are like crack – addictive. And I’m getting that feeling again, working on this rather strange little problem of philosophy. Math is the nerd’s equivalent of world of warcraft, and it may be the ultimate game of world of warcraft – how do we create deductions of all possible relations? It’s fascinating. Is it possible to create a description of all possible relations (a proof)? I don’t see why not. There may not be a route from every position in every field to every other position in every other field; but their might be, and I can’t understand, even if circuitously how their couldn’t be. I mean, maths is just an enormous truth table.

    And intuitively I would much rather solve a puzzle. The reason being that all the information needed to solve the puzzle is present. I don’t have to go out and perform empirical tests to guarantee what I sense and what I record are causally related. In math the study of pure relations, independent of time, and under formalism, independent of correspondence and context, I don’t have to concern myself with the cost of tests, the passage of time, or contextual constraints on relations OTHER than whether I can construct a proof (deduction) for those relations.

    But it’s incredibly interesting. And just like suppressing the desire to play videogames, I feel like I have to suppress my desire to play with math. Not because it’s unimportant, but because in the division of labor, my particular craft is not pure relations, but those actions which result in the possible and preferable cooperation between individuals and groups in increasingly great numbers.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-06 08:43:00 UTC

  • HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS? Need a mathematical historian. Boole onward, through Hil

    HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS?

    Need a mathematical historian. Boole onward, through Hilbert and Broewer.

    When Boole, Frege, Peano Russell, Hilbert et al, developed boolean algebra and set theory, cumulating in ZFC+AC, theory did they understand WHY their solution worked, but was now disconnected from reality, correspondence, and truth?

    I can’t find anything but it’s got to be there. It looks like it starts with Frege? How did they categorize the problem?

    Is this one of those things like property rights, that we didn’t understand the cause, but talk about incessantly?

    Or is the reason that boolean (binary), and sets, solve the problem of precision in context?

    Someone smarter than I am had to solve this already….. But if not Broewer, who?


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 16:27:00 UTC

  • CAN I GET HELP WITH HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY? (edited) (request for he

    CAN I GET HELP WITH HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY?

    (edited) (request for help) (foundations of mathematics)

    Need a mathematical historian. Someone very well versed in teaching theory.

    I am going to say this badly because I don’t know the correct way to ask it:

    0) the classical construction of mathematics is an operational and (identity, counting and measurement) and analog one. It is the practical uniting of counting, measurement, geometry, and algebraic logic (deduction).

    1) The ZFC+AC argument (the set argument) converts the practice of math from one of dimensions (space and analog) to one of sets (binary). This allows the excluded middle. It is a very artful way of solving the problem, by simply returning to the very basics of the origination of counting. But the set solution is achieved by removing scale and therefore contextual utility from the calculation, leaving us with no means of external reference for choice of precision. I see this solution as useful, but a fabrication.. a ‘trick’. Whereas, one could just say ‘precision of N’, and increase or decrease that precision as needed. (Although this approach would require tagging variables or numbers I think, or maybe prevent us from reducing ratios including real numbers.) The solution to the problem of scale and context (analog representation) by converting to binary (set membership) representation is actually very interesting one. The question is, was it knowingly made, or what this solution achieved without understanding that the problem of context and scale was solved by effectively reducing math from analog (related to the real world scale) and binary (independent of real world scale). I can’t figure it out from the literature.

    2) The constructivist argument relies on a binary proof. (“Russian Recursive Mathematics”) This method disallows the excluded middle. (and double negation). It is a higher standard of proof. However, I don’t understand why we could not construct a syntax for the explicit preservation of scale (correspondence with whatever context we have in mind) and thereby retain correspondence as well as the excluded middle. (I am not sure about double negation. I haven’t thought it through yet.)

    3) Computational mathematics is both operational and binary.

    But why aren’t these three methods a spectrum – just like description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice? I mean, at the early end of the spectrum (0, 1) we require deduction, and at the later end of the spectrum (2,3) we require computability. The reason we have a problem with (1) and (2) is because they give upon correspondence (context). And with that we lose the use of context for determining the precision of a calculation.

    Deduction in context is always easier because we have information with which to make a choice (precision). But outside of context we cannot use external information, so we must rely on a binary choice (or decidability). Deduction is a very different problem from computation.

    Or, can we say then, that the foundations of mathematics have been wrongly divorced from correspondence and context by cantor through ZFC? When we could just say that binary is a universal substitute for arbitrary precision? I mean, that’s the functional equivalent of it?

    I need a frame of reference within the language of mathematics to talk about this issue and I don’t know how to get to it. I don’t even know how to ask this question any better than this?

    Was the solution to the foundations of math, culminating in ZFC+AC, understood as providing a solution to creating independence from the problem of correspondence and scale at the expense of ‘truth’ while retaining ‘proof’ and internal consistency?

    Or stated this way: Did mathematical philosophers understand that they were divorcing ‘departmental mathematics’ from physics (cause and correspondence) and logic (truth) by adopting ZFC+AC, thereby creating a study of pure relations independent of context?

    I have worked through both sides of the debate to the best of my ability.

    Why can the reason that sets work – reduction to binary in order to escape the burden of retaining context – simply be stated openly? I mean, if all it does is render scale infinitely variable, then that explains why ZFC works, and all these platonic devices are necessary: they create deducibility and computability. And it’s not ‘wrong’ per se, in the sense that it doesn’t produce correct calculations independent of context, or rather, independent of SCALE and therefore independent of correspondence. But it does sort of render mathematics platonic and almost magical rather than computational and rational.

    In that sense, we get to logically state WHY these methods work and when and when not they are applicable. The excluded middle is a problem of scale (analog, and correspondent values).

    In the end, the set method is useful because is just SO MUCH LESS BURDENSOME, but that’s all.

    But still, teaching people operational mathematics, and higher criteria of proof under constructive math, and then explicitly stating that we can move to sets at the expense of correspondence in order to obtain the ability to practice double negation and the excluded middle is not a problem, it’s a tool not a truth.

    I don’t need to solve this problem for my work. But since math is the gold standard, and contains this particularly burdensome problem, if I can describe the consequences in mathematics of non-operational language leading to platonism, I can explain why non-operational language in ethics, likewise leads to platonism.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 16:05:00 UTC

  • “Information is that which is sufficient to cause a change in state.”

    “Information is that which is sufficient to cause a change in state.”


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 13:23:00 UTC

  • THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IS THE SUBJECTIVE VALUE OF THE DI

    THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IS THE SUBJECTIVE VALUE OF THE DIFFERENT OUTPUTS.

    (expanded and edited)

    It has nothing to do with method.

    The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either:

    (a) the product of the test;

    OR

    (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test.

    The purpose of engineering is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe.

    The purpose of computer science is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe. The purpose of physical science is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe.

    That, in the last case, of physical sciences, as in the case of mathematics, the ‘human wants’ are largely the desire to know the additional properties of something,and the outputs of the tests are but a byproduct, is not materially different from engineering where the outputs of the tests (production) are what is desired, while the advancement in our theories is but a byproduct.

    That in computer science, biological research, or engineering, we place equal or higher value on the production of our tests, than we do on the advancement of our general theories, is a statement about the relative value of the various outputs, not statement about any difference in method.

    This can be restated as “the products of our tests in some fields finance further expansion of knowledge, and in other fields the products of our tests do not produce intermediate products that finance our further expansion of our theories.”

    That is the only difference.

    That is the answer you know. Everything else is nonsense.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 12:47:00 UTC

  • ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for ar

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION

    (reposted from cr page for archiving)

    All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties.

    Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation.

    These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them.

    Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning.

    So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse.

    Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’.

    Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies.

    Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes.

    From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.)

    It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation.

    And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences.

    CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice.

    Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god.

    But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field.

    But prohibition was not in itself an answer.

    Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination.

    That is the answer.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-02 13:08:00 UTC

  • ENDING MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM : BECAUSE IT’S IMMORAL (ISN”T THAT ENOUGH OF A REA

    ENDING MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM : BECAUSE IT’S IMMORAL (ISN”T THAT ENOUGH OF A REASON?)

    (reposted from elsewhere for archival purposes)

    Math was constructed from, and must, of necessity, consist of a series of operations. And consequently, all mathematics is reducible to a few simple operations. (Which is why computers can calculate.) In practice. everything we can think of can be reduced to adding or removing one, and the test of equality.

    (As an aside, this is why we can explain more possibilities with mathematics than the physical universe can demonstrate in reality: because the universe does not have this level of freedom due to the apparent complexity of its interacting forces.)

    The act of adding and subtracting the symbols we call numerals and positional numbers, is an obvious and common example of creating symbols to replace what would be tedious and incomprehensible repetitions.

    This necessity to use symbols to condense information into usable components (categories) is what our brains need to do. Imagine trying to do all operations by counting? It would be impossible. We could not function without these symbols.

    Furthermore, describing mathematical equations and proofs as operations is both verbally and syntactically burdensome. And since these operations are largely simple, and can be accurately reduced to symbols (named functions) there is little value in articulating them as operations.

    So mathematicians have developed a multitude of symbols and names for what are not extant objects, but names of functions (sets of operations) – just as every other discipline creates heavily loaded terms in order to allow informationally dense communication with fewer words.

    Most ‘numbers’ are anything but: they are names, glyphs and symbols, for functions that consist of large numbers of operations. “The natural numbers exist in nature, but all else is the work of man.”

    The reason for this complexity is that quantitative, and directional relationships are expressed as ratios, and while some ratios are reducible to numbers, others are not. Those that are not reducible must be expressed as functions. We have not invented a mathematical system that can circumvent this problem. It is possible such a thing cannot be done.

    Now aside from the practical utility of creating symbols, that obscure the operations, there is a practical value in using these names by disconnecting these names from their operations and from correspondence with any given scale.

    That is, that disconnection allows one to use the logic of mathematics independent of cause, correspondence and scale, to explore ONLY the properties of the relations between the entities in question. And this turns out to be extremely useful for deducing what causes we do not now.

    And this extraordinary utility has been responsible for the fact that the discipline has laundered time, causality and scale (precision) from the discipline. But one cannot say that a mathematical statement is true without correspondence with the real world. We can say it is internally consistent (a proof), but not that it is true (descriptive of reality via correspondence).

    Mathematics when ‘wrong’ most recently, with Cantor’s sets, in which he used imaginary objects, infinity, the excluded middle and the the axiom of choice, to preserve this syntactical convenience of names, and in doing so, completed the diversion of mathematics from a logic of truth (external correspondence), to one that is merely a logic of proof (internal consistency).

    Cantor’s work came at the expense of correspondence, and by consequence at the expense of truth. ie: mathematics does not determine truths, only proofs, because all correspondence has been removed by these ‘contrivances’, whose initial purpose was convenience, but whose accumulated errors have led to such (frankly, absurd) debates, .

    So the problem with mathematical platonism, which turns out to be fairly useful for the convenience of practitioners, is not so much a technical problem but a MORAL ONE. First, mathematicians, even the best, rarely grasp this concept. Second, since, because it is EASIER to construct mathematical proofs than any other form of logic, it is the gold standard for other forms of logic. And the envy of other disciplines. And as such mathematical platonism has ‘bled’ into other envious fields, the same way that Physics has bled into economics.

    Worse, this multi-axial new mysticism has been adopted by philosophers from Kant to the Frankfurt school to the postmodernists, to contemporary totalitarian humanists as a vehicle for reinserting arational mysticism into political debate – as a means of obtaining power.

    Quite contrary to academic opinion, all totalitarianism is, is catholicism restated in non-religious terms, with the academy replacing the church as the constructor of obscurant language.

    I suspect this fairly significant error is what has plagued the physics community, but we have found no alternative to current approaches. Albeit, I expect, that if we retrained mathematicians, physicists, and economists to require operational language in the expression of mathematical relations, that whatever error we are making in our understanding of physics would emerge within a generation.

    No infinity can exist. Because no operation can be performed infinitely. We can however, adjust the precision and scale of any proof to suit the context, since any mathematical expression, consists of ratios that, if correspond to reality, we can arbitrarily adjust for increasing precision.

    Mathematics cannot claim truth without correspondence.

    Correspondence in measures is a function of scale and the UTILITY of precision, in the CONTEXT of which the operation is calculated (limit).

    A language of mathematics that is described independent of scale in given context, can be correctly stated. It need not be magian.

    Fields can still be understood to be imaginary patterns.

    But the entire reason that we find such things interesting, is a folly of the mind, no different from the illusion of movement in a film.

    The real world exists. We are weak computers of property in pursuit of our reproduction and amusement. We developed many forms of instrumentalism to extend our weak abilities. We must use instruments and methods to reduce to analogies to experience, those things which we cannot directly do so.

    It’s just that simple.

    AGAINST THE PLATONIC (IMAGINARY) WORLD

    Why must we support imaginary objects, as extant? Especially when the constructive argument (intuitionist) in operational language, can provide equal explanatory power?

    Why must we rely on ZFC+AC when we have recursive math, or when we can explain all mathematics in operational language without loss of context, scale, precision and utility? Just ’cause it’s easier.

    But that complexity is a defense against obscurantism and platonism. So it is merely a matter of cost.

    I understand Popper as trying to solve a problem of meta ethics, rather than anything particularly scientific. And I see most of his work as doing the best he could for the purposes that I’ve stated.

    Anyone who disagrees with me would have to disagree with my premies and my argument, not rely on the existence of platonist entities (magic) in order to win such an argument.

    That this is impossible, is at least something that I understand if no one else yet does. I don’t so much need someone to agree with me as constantly improve my argument so that I can test and harden it until it is unassailable or defeated.

    I think that defeating this argument is going to be very, very, difficult.

    TIME AND OPERATIONS (ACTIONS) IN TIME

    One cannot state that abstract ideas can be constructed independent of time, or even that they could be identified without changes in state over time. Or that thought can occur without the passage of time. Or consciousness can occur without the passage of time.

    Whether I make one choice or another is not material. This question is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of possibility. I can make no choice without the passage of time.

    I think that the only certain knowledge consists of negations, and that all the rest is conjecture. This is the only moral position to take. And it is the only moral position since argument exists for the purpose of persuasion, and persuasion for cooperation.

    I keep seeing this sort of desire to promote the rather obvious idea that induction is nonsense – yet everyone uses it, as a tremendous diversion from the fact that induction is necessary for action in real time, whenever the cost of not acting is higher than the cost of acting.

    Description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice are just descriptions of the processes we must use given the amount of information at our disposal. Science has no urgency, and life threatening emergencies do.

    Popper (and CR-ists for that matter) seem to want to perpetuate either mysticism, or skepticism as religion, rather than make the very simple point that the demands for ‘truth’ increase and decrease given the necessity of acting in time.

    I guess that I could take a psychological detour into why people would want to do this. But I suspect that I am correct (as I stated in one of these posts) that popper was, as part of his era, trying to react against the use of science and academia to replace the coercive power of the church. So he restated skepticism by establishing very high criteria for scientific truth.

    And all the nonsense that continues to be written about his work seek to read into platonic tea leaves, when the facts are quite SIMPLE. (Back to Argumentation Ethics at this point.) The fact is that humans must act in real time and as the urgency of action increases so does the demand for truth. Conversely, as the demand for cooperation increases, the demand for truth increases. Finally at the top of the scale we have science, which in itself is an expensive pursuit, and as such one is forbidden to externalize costs to other scientists. (Although if we look at papers this doesn’t actually work that well except at the very top margin.)

    THE QUESTION IS ONE OF COOPERATION

    The problem is ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE AND MORAL, not scientific.

    It’s just that simple. We cannot disconnect argument from cooperation without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect math from context without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect numbers from identity without entering the platonic.

    Each form of logic constrains the other. But the logic that constrains them all, is action. Without action, we end up with the delusions we spend most of philosophical discourse on. It’s all nonsense.

    I understand the difference between the real and the unreal, and the necessity of our various logics as instruments for the reduction of that which we cannot comprehend (sympathize with) to analogies to experience that we can comprehend ( sympathize with).

    Which is profound if you grasp it.

    THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLS AND ECONOMY OF LANGUAGE

    If you cannot describe something as human action, then you do not understand it. Operational language is the most important, and least articulated canon of science.

    I do not argue against the economy of language. I argue against the loss of causality and correspondence that accompanies repeated use of economizing terms.

    ( I am pretty sure I put a bullet in this topic along with apriorism in economics. )

    MORAL STANDARDS OF TRUTH

    Requiring a higher standard of truth places a higher barrier on cooperation.

    This is most important in matters of involuntary transfer, such as taxation or social and moral norms.

    Religions place an impossible standard of truth. This is why they are used so effectively to resist the state. Religious doctrine reliant upon faith is argumentatively inviolable.

    As such, no cooperation can be asked or offered outside of their established terms. … It’s brilliant really. Its why religious groups can resist the predation of the state.

    I would prefer instead we relied upon a prohibition on obscurant language and the requisite illustration of involuntary transfers, such that exchanges were easily made possible, and discounts (thefts) made nearly impossible.

    This is, the correct criteria for CR, not the platonic one that is assumed. In this light CR looks correct in practice if incorrect in argument.

    (There. I did it. Took me a bit.)

    Curt Doolittle


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-02 10:44:00 UTC

  • I really do like the idea of a limit to computation, I think the Anthropic princ

    http://hplusmagazine.com/2013/12/27/video-friday-brainfood-seth-lloyd-on-the-universe-as-quantum-computer/While I really do like the idea of a limit to computation, I think the Anthropic principle, strong especially, but weak as well, is religion, not science. I don’t yet see any evidence that measurement or observability is always within our grasp, nor that determinism is sufficient that deduction can serve to render the unobservable predictable, other than for general rules. It’s not that it isn’t, it’s that I don’t yet grasp why it’s necessary, and unless it’s necessary, such statements are far closer in structure to prior anthropocentric ideas than those that have disabused anthropocentric ideas. So I can’t really state it. I would argue possibly instead, that any mind capable of introspection, which can make use of sufficient instrumentation to detect causal relations, can reduce those causal relations to analogies to experience. This basically argues that intelligence and instrumentalism are capable of perceiving any reasonably deterministic order. I am extremely suspicious of the argument that the rules of the universe are fungible. And it appears instead, that we fail to understand the properties of the universe and as such our model will suit nearly any math we throw at it. For this reason, we know our model is wrong. I suspect that because our model is wrong, so is the anthropic principle.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle


    Source date (UTC): 2013-12-29 10:53:00 UTC