Category: Politics, Power, and Governance

  • RE: FUKUYAMA ON AMERICAN POLITICAL REGULATORY BURDEN – WE DON”T TRUST GOVT. Fran

    RE: FUKUYAMA ON AMERICAN POLITICAL REGULATORY BURDEN – WE DON”T TRUST GOVT.
    Francis,
    RE:
    https://
    youtube.com/watch?v=iZsIkn
    hLOLA

    Long term student and fan. I understand your argument, but I have a very difficult time comparing the evidence of bureaucratic behavior, especially given the credentialist background of government employees instead of historical public service as a result of demonstrated competency in military, industrial, or business disciplines.

    My organization’s work in the law – which still holds up somewhat compared to other organs of government, encounters a deep incompetence outside of a handful at the appellate and supreme levels. I agree with the loss of prestige in government work driving out possible candidates. I agree with the demand for private litigation to correct public problems. Our organization uses the limited vehicles in the common law to do so ourselves.

    But I also agree with the tragic failure of our education system beginning with the early sixties attack on it. So I’m not disagreeing with your criticisms. I’m disagreeing that the people in government are capable of the work and responsibility you wish to give them. (I”ve built two of the larger privately held consulting companies, and government work isn’t a problem of regulations so much as – it’s a problem of quality and competency.) The problems DOGE surfaced were not outliers.

    Worse, while you compare our government to others, our government of 340M was not designed like ‘other liberal democracies’ with no more than 80M in a concentrated geography. It was designed as a market for the production of commons between the states, given the necessity of a secular empirical government because of the four foundational populations being of different religious fundamentalist populations still reacting to the protestant reformation and the european wars given the parasitism of the church and the state and the nobility.

    And just as europe is discovering that unification is impossible for anything but defense, Americans are discovering that their post-civil-war unification, legitimized by early 20th trade and war era insulation from europe’s suicide, is no longer possible. Worse, the success of the left and excessive immigration of costly dependents has amplified that divisiveness.

    So I am aware of your biases – each of our generations has them.I’m only ten years younger than you are. And even that difference is noticeable in our generations. And your works on trust and political order were foundational for me and my work. But your faith in liberal democracy doesn’t really hold up to scrutiny.

    Why? America goes through a crisis about every eighty years – purging accumulated ‘corruption’ that has become entrenched in a model that no longer serves the national and international circumstances. Trump is the fifth or sixth president to have made such reformations: Trump, Reagan, FDR, Lincoln, and Jackson.

    We voted the most competent president in our history (Bush 1) out of office when he could have reordered the world in gentlemanly fashion.

    Now we are stuck with stress conditions and Trump’s Shock and Awe urgency.

    Affections
    Curt Doolittle
    The Natural Law Institute


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-21 23:07:44 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2025346731773493391

  • Israel doesn’t kill Americans. Iranians and their proxies do. Israel doesn’t cre

    Israel doesn’t kill Americans. Iranians and their proxies do. Israel doesn’t create instability. Iranians and their proxies do. The jews, or at least, political jews and financial sector jews, are in fact a problem in the west. But they are also a benefit. There is no benefit to anyone from the Islamist regime in Iran.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-21 20:51:29 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2025312443833221214

  • WHY FRANCE IS THE LAST SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE (And why france is running out of

    WHY FRANCE IS THE LAST SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE
    (And why france is running out of time.)

    https://youtube.com/watch?v=bZJn9mqrG-Q…

    I have said for twenty years at least that france is as much the enemy of europe as russia. But worse, it is the enemy of the french people. They were bribed into comforts. And now the game is lost.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-20 18:53:34 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2024920380083949727

  • (Russian Media) Vladimir Solovyov of “Full Contact” RU Channel One (State Media)

    (Russian Media)
    Vladimir Solovyov of “Full Contact” RU Channel One (State Media) is preparing the audience for defeat. I’ve been seeing the drift for about two months, but at this point it is what it is.

    The problem is serious however, and will require someone on our end, their end, or both provide an escape hatch for at least Putin, and likely others.

    Putin’s the wealthiest man in the world. It’s not impossible for him to find safety. But the Russians are not kind to fallen idols.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-20 03:49:49 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2024692943374672183

  • “Ethnonationalism is a reaction precisely to most of these people NOT being net

    –“Ethnonationalism is a reaction precisely to most of these people NOT being net contributors. NOT “integrating” in any but the most superficial way. NOT showing the slightest amount of gratitude or respect to Britain, but demanding that the very nature of the nation is changed


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-19 23:30:28 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2024627676045332970

  • WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, LIBERALISM, AND NEO-LIBERAL

    WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, LIBERALISM, AND NEO-LIBERALISM.

    These labels name overlapping families of ideas, but people use them at different scopes, so the necessary first step is disambiguation: “liberalism” is the umbrella; “classical liberalism” and “neoliberalism” are historically specific variants inside that umbrella.

    CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
    Classical liberalism is the early (17th–19th century) form of liberalism that treats the central political problem as protecting individual liberty—primarily via limited, accountable government, rule of law, and strong property/contract rights, with markets doing most allocation work.
    Operationally: it prefers negative liberty (freedom from interference) as the default constraint on state action.

    LIBERALISM
    “Liberalism” is a broader doctrine centered on individual rights and autonomy and equality of opportunity—but what that implies for the state depends on the variant (classical, welfare-state/egalitarian, etc.).
    In many 20th-century Anglo-American contexts, “liberalism” often refers to welfare-state / liberal egalitarian forms that treat some state capacity (regulation, social insurance, public provision) as necessary to secure effective opportunity and protect individuals not only from the state but also from certain forms of private power.
    Operationally: it allows more positive-liberty reasoning (freedom as capability to act, not merely non-interference).

    NEOLIBERALISM
    “Neoliberalism” is a late-20th-century ideology/policy model that re-centers market competition and promotes reforms like deregulation, privatization, trade/capital liberalization, and (often) fiscal restraint, while still relying on the state to create/enforce the legal-institutional conditions for markets to operate.
    A common operational proxy is the “Washington Consensus” package (trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, etc.), originally associated with IMF/World Bank/Treasury-era reform advice.
    Important constraint: the term is contested and is used both descriptively and as a criticism, so any precise use should specify which policy bundle and which time/place.

    THE DIFFERENCE, REDUCED TO TESTABLE DIMENSIONS
    Scope of “liberalism”: umbrella family vs a specific 20th-century welfare-state variant. (Ambiguity is the main failure mode.)
    Liberty concept: classical liberalism defaults to negative liberty; modern/welfare liberalism more readily treats capability as politically relevant; neoliberalism mostly returns to market/negative-liberty framing but with an explicit focus on competition policy and market construction.
    State’s economic role:
    classical: state as referee (law, security, contracts) more than manager;
    modern liberalism: state as insurer/provider/regulator to secure opportunity and manage market failures;
    neoliberalism: state as market-architect/enforcer plus privatizer/deregulator in many sectors.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-19 16:16:09 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2024518376463499314

  • France is perhaps the least aligned country in europe – seeking control over it

    France is perhaps the least aligned country in europe – seeking control over it as much as the russians do. Yet both french policy and russian policy has led to the same demographic and economic ends. France will cease to exist as both french and as a redistributive policy rather shortly as it has never covered its debt – and it’s expanding faster than she can ever correct it.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-17 17:38:38 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2023814357952721080

  • The Trump Strategy is to respect rulers so that negotiation and trade is possibl

    The Trump Strategy is to respect rulers so that negotiation and trade is possible. This strategy is profoundly successful worldwide – even if, in the case of hostiles like putin, iran, and the CCP, they take advantage of it using delay and deceive. It keeps open lines of communication.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-17 17:37:05 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2023813968486428955

  • Human Rights as Anti-Imperial, Anti-Communist, Anti-authoriatarian postwar state

    Human Rights as Anti-Imperial, Anti-Communist, Anti-authoriatarian postwar statecraft.

    “No more (a) empires and (b) european wars, and (c) no more word wars (d) take adam smith’s advice, (e) end empires (f) create nation states (g) and organize them into federations. (h) the result should be peace and prosperity: the pax americana – and it worked.”

    I think by the present generation the horrors of the world wars, the collapse of the british empire in particular and more broadly, europe, that resulted, was driving demand for ‘never again’ especially by americans who had viewed the warlike nature of european empires with disdain for a hundred and fifty years. (The same way americans vew the political decadence of europe at american expense today..)

    The purpose of human rights in the 20th century was strategic and slightly dependent upon the theatre of operations:

    The “Western demand for human rights” in the twentieth century functioned less as a single moral thesis than as a multi-use instrument whose strategic objective depended on the theater of competition.

    1) External objective (Cold War): impose political costs on rival regimes without kinetic war

    Human-rights language let Western states and publics shift competition onto the informational and legitimacy plane: treat dissident complaints as obligations violated, publicize violations, and thereby raise the Soviet bloc’s governance costs (repression, surveillance, censorship) while lowering the West’s costs of confrontation (because the “argument” becomes compliance with signed commitments rather than a bid for territory). The Helsinki “process” is the operational case: Basket III commitments became a durable hook for monitoring, naming, shaming, and organizing opposition inside the Eastern bloc.

    2) System objective (post-1945 order): construct a common legitimacy language for Western leadership

    After 1945, U.S.-backed “universal” human-rights talk supplied a portable standard usable across alliances, decolonization conflicts, and international institutions: it converted disputes over governance into disputes over compliance with norms, which is strategically useful for coalition maintenance and agenda-setting in global fora.

    3) Internal objective (rule-of-law grammar): convert anti-parasitism constraints into enforceable “rights”

    In the Natural Law Institute’s framing, “rights” are not metaphysical endowments; they are positive legal encodings of prohibitions—i.e., “prohibitions against parasitism can be positively expressed as contractual ‘rights’.” The strategic objective, in that grammar, is to force disputes into decidable, reciprocal, liability-bearing forms rather than discretionary rule. This aligns with the same document’s description of European strategy as sovereignty + reciprocity + rule-of-law/markets as a competitive adaptation mechanism.

    4) 1970s “rights turn” objective (U.S. poli wartime shocks

    “A separate, contingent objective in the late twentieth century (especially the 1970s) was domestic-political rehabilitation: human-rights policy provided a way to reframe U.S. foreign policy and restore confidence after Vietnam/Watergate-era credibility damage.” (This is a prominent thesis in the historiography).

    Martin makes the common historiographic error of presuming a baseline that never existed, and a baseline today that is not superior to what did exist.
    The anglosphere united the world in trade and communications and finance. This had uneven effects. But what it achieved was the near end of poverty worldwide. Just as the british ended slavery worldwide.

    You can’t defeat the anglosphere on moral grounds, only on unpredicted externalities – which are not to be ignored, but corrected.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-17 17:36:29 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2023813819395699072

  • Exposition At its core, this is about how societies manage the trade-offs betwee

    Exposition
    At its core, this is about how societies manage the trade-offs between fostering large-scale cooperation and protecting against exploitation. Western systems, according to this view, create “trust discounts” that make interactions cheaper and faster, boosting efficiency and innovation—but at the risk of making social capital easier to erode. In contrast, many non-Western systems maintain higher barriers to trust, which slows growth but better insulates against parasites. I’ll expand on this step by step, drawing out the key mechanisms, implications, and real-world parallels.

    1. The Western Model: Trust Discounts as a Double-Edged Sword

    Core Mechanism: In high-trust Western societies (rooted in traditions like common law, Protestant work ethic, and civic institutions), there’s an embedded assumption of reciprocal constraint—the idea that people will generally not impose costs on others without mutual benefit or accountability. This creates “dividends on trust,” where distributed responsibility reduces the need for constant vigilance or vetting in everyday interactions.
    – Think of it economically: Transaction costs (time, effort, and resources spent on deals, contracts, or relationships) are discounted because the baseline expectation is cooperation. For example, you can walk into a store, buy something on credit, or form a business partnership with minimal upfront scrutiny, assuming the other party will uphold their end.
    – This “widened latitude for risk-taking” accelerates cooperation beyond family or tribal lines, enabling massive scaling—think industrial revolutions, global trade networks, or open-source innovation ecosystems like Silicon Valley.

    The Downside: Cheapening Social Capital and Enabling Freeriding

    – These discounts inadvertently lower the barriers for defectors (people or groups who exploit without contributing). When trust is cheap to access, it’s easier for freeriders to “privatize the commons”—benefiting from shared resources (like public infrastructure, welfare systems, or cultural norms) while imposing unreciprocated costs.

    – ContraFabianist highlights how this reduces the “costs of baiting into hazard”: In a high-trust environment, scammers, corrupt actors, or ideological subversives face lower entry barriers because suspicion is not the default. The same mechanisms that speed up legitimate cooperation (e.g., minimal bureaucracy) also make it cheaper to consume “pooled social capital” without replenishing it.

    – Result: Erosion of trust over time, leading to phenomena like declining civic participation (as documented in Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, which charts the drop in U.S. community bonds since the mid-20th century) or rising polarization, where exploiters game the system (e.g., corporate lobbying that captures regulatory commons for private gain).

    Historical and Economic Parallels:

    – Western Europe’s transition from feudalism to market economies relied on institutions like guilds and courts that enforced reciprocity, creating trust surpluses that fueled the Enlightenment and capitalism. Ronald Coase’s theory of transaction costs aligns here: Lower costs enable larger firms and markets, but without safeguards, they invite opportunism (as in agency problems or moral hazard).

    – Modern examples include Nordic countries’ high-trust welfare states, where low corruption enables efficient public services—but immigration or economic shocks can strain this if newcomers don’t internalize the same norms, leading to debates on “trust decay.”

    2. Non-Western Systems: Higher Suspicion as a Protective Barrier

    Core Mechanism: Outside the West (e.g., in many parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America), the baseline is often one of suspicion toward non-kin or outsiders. Trust is preserved within tight networks (family, clans, or ethnic groups) but extended cautiously, with higher upfront costs for verification and enforcement.

    This “higher baseline of suspicion” means consuming trust is more expensive: Deals require extensive negotiation, guarantees, or intermediaries (e.g., bribes in corrupt systems aren’t just exploitation but a crude way to signal commitment). Reciprocal constraint isn’t assumed; it’s explicitly built and monitored.

    Benefits: This curbs parasitism by raising the bar for defectors. Freeriding is harder because access to commons (social, economic, or political) is gated, reducing the velocity of exploitation.

    The Trade-Off: Limited ScalabilityWhile this preserves trust within bounded groups, it hampers large-scale cooperation. Discounts on signaling cooperative intent are minimal, so transactions are slower and costlier—limiting economic velocity, innovation, and growth.
    ContraFabianist notes that non-Western systems haven’t “approximated the accumulated discounts” the West has encoded over centuries, so they prioritize preservation over expansion. This results in more resilient but smaller-scale commons.

    Historical and Economic Parallels:
    – In clan-based societies like those in parts of the Arab world or sub-Saharan Africa, trust is kin-centric (as per Francis Fukuyama’s Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity), leading to stable but fragmented economies. High suspicion deters broad parasitism but fosters nepotism or corruption as workarounds.

    – China’s historical mandarin bureaucracy or modern “guanxi” networks exemplify this: Relationships are built slowly with high vetting costs, enabling massive scale once established (e.g., Belt and Road Initiative) but at the expense of openness to outsiders.

    – Contrast with Western vulnerabilities: Events like the 2008 financial crisis showed how low-barrier trust in derivatives markets allowed widespread freeriding by banks, eroding social capital far more than in suspicion-heavy systems like Russia’s oligarchic economy, where exploitation is contained but growth is stunted.

    3. Broader Implications and the Core Tension

    – Vulnerability in High-Trust Systems: The West’s strength—efficient scaling through trust discounts—becomes its Achilles’ heel when facing non-reciprocal actors (e.g., ideological movements, mass migration without assimilation, or globalized crime). As ContraFabianist puts it, the weakness isn’t in producing expensive commons but in the discounts that “accelerate the velocity of cooperation at the expense of reducing the barriers to parasitism.” This echoes game theory concepts like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where repeated interactions favor cooperators in high-trust settings—until defectors multiply.

    – Pathways Forward: To mitigate this, suggestions from similar thinkers (e.g., in Natural Law Institute circles, which Curt Doolittle is associated with) include reinstating stricter reciprocity enforcement—through legal reforms, cultural revivals, or tech-enabled transparency—to raise defection costs without losing scalability. Non-Western systems might benefit from selective trust-building to unlock growth, as seen in Singapore’s hybrid model blending suspicion with enforced meritocracy.

    The Choice
    This exposition highlights a fundamental societal design choice: Optimize for speed and scale (West) or resilience and preservation (non-West)?

    Both have merits, but the confusion Weinhagen notes—mistaking responsibility for unfettered freedom—exacerbates the West’s risks, inviting exploitation that could undermine its engine altogether.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-02-15 19:19:51 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2023115055244759460