Category: Politics, Power, and Governance

  • STARVE THE CATHEDRAL The Cathedral is, without question, a religion – so we must

    STARVE THE CATHEDRAL

    The Cathedral is, without question, a religion – so we must separate church and state. Right? Easy. Imagine what happens to universities if they must be paid out of future earnings by graduates, just as income taxes are paid out of future earnings by graduates?

    Starve the beast.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-07 07:27:00 UTC

  • The Transaction Cost Theory of Government

    PROPERTARIANISM: THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
    (second draft) (closer)

    [H]istory says only that the development of a state – a monopoly bureaucracy – transfers high local transaction costs without central rents, to state rents and low transaction cost. Libertarians nearly universally ignore the evidence of universal transaction costs and free riding at the local level.

    And they further ignore the demonstrated necessity using organized violence by a monopoly organization to suppress those transaction costs and free ridings (“local rents”), and to convert them into central rents in order to pay for such suppression.

    The counter-argument is that states are in fact a neutral cost, and that we don’t spend enough on them in the suppression of transaction costs, because states provide multiples of return on that suppression. This is also demonstrable.

    The question isn’t how we can do without the state (a corporation articulated as a monopoly definition of property rights ), but now that we have suppressed local transaction costs, and replaced them with centralized rents in order to produce the commons we call property rights – how do we suppress centralized rents while maintaining the suppression of transaction costs, and the ability to construct commons that such suppression of transaction costs and rents allows us to construct?

    To argue that a monopoly definition of property rights is somehow “bad”, is irrational since property, obtained by homesteading and by voluntarily exchange, under the requirements for productivity, warranty and symmetry, is as far as I know, as logically consistent and exception-less as are mathematical operations on natural numbers. So the imposition of property rights cannot be illogical, immoral, unethical no matter how they are imposed since they define that which is logical, ethical and moral.

    There is nothing wrong whatsoever with violence – in fact, it is violence with which we pay for property rights and liberty – it is our first, most important resource in the construction of liberty. Instead, the question is purely institutional: having used violence to centralize transaction costs into rents, how do we now use violence to eliminate rents from the central organization?

    This is pretty easy: Universal standing, Universal Property rights, and Organically constructed, Common Law, predicated upon the one law of property rights as positive articulation of the prohibition on and the suppression of involuntary transfers: the demand for fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchanges free of externality. Because it is only under fully informed, productive, voluntary transfer, warrantied and free of externality that cooperation is rational, rather than parasitic. And only under rational cooperation is forgoing one’s opportunity to use violence equally rational.

    The question becomes then, who prohibits the formation of authority and this falls to the citizenry: the militia – those who possess violence.

    As far as I know this is the correct analysis of political evolution, and the correct theory for future political action.

    Curt Doolittle 
    The Propertarian Institute 
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • The Transaction Cost Theory of Government

    PROPERTARIANISM: THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
    (second draft) (closer)

    [H]istory says only that the development of a state – a monopoly bureaucracy – transfers high local transaction costs without central rents, to state rents and low transaction cost. Libertarians nearly universally ignore the evidence of universal transaction costs and free riding at the local level.

    And they further ignore the demonstrated necessity using organized violence by a monopoly organization to suppress those transaction costs and free ridings (“local rents”), and to convert them into central rents in order to pay for such suppression.

    The counter-argument is that states are in fact a neutral cost, and that we don’t spend enough on them in the suppression of transaction costs, because states provide multiples of return on that suppression. This is also demonstrable.

    The question isn’t how we can do without the state (a corporation articulated as a monopoly definition of property rights ), but now that we have suppressed local transaction costs, and replaced them with centralized rents in order to produce the commons we call property rights – how do we suppress centralized rents while maintaining the suppression of transaction costs, and the ability to construct commons that such suppression of transaction costs and rents allows us to construct?

    To argue that a monopoly definition of property rights is somehow “bad”, is irrational since property, obtained by homesteading and by voluntarily exchange, under the requirements for productivity, warranty and symmetry, is as far as I know, as logically consistent and exception-less as are mathematical operations on natural numbers. So the imposition of property rights cannot be illogical, immoral, unethical no matter how they are imposed since they define that which is logical, ethical and moral.

    There is nothing wrong whatsoever with violence – in fact, it is violence with which we pay for property rights and liberty – it is our first, most important resource in the construction of liberty. Instead, the question is purely institutional: having used violence to centralize transaction costs into rents, how do we now use violence to eliminate rents from the central organization?

    This is pretty easy: Universal standing, Universal Property rights, and Organically constructed, Common Law, predicated upon the one law of property rights as positive articulation of the prohibition on and the suppression of involuntary transfers: the demand for fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchanges free of externality. Because it is only under fully informed, productive, voluntary transfer, warrantied and free of externality that cooperation is rational, rather than parasitic. And only under rational cooperation is forgoing one’s opportunity to use violence equally rational.

    The question becomes then, who prohibits the formation of authority and this falls to the citizenry: the militia – those who possess violence.

    As far as I know this is the correct analysis of political evolution, and the correct theory for future political action.

    Curt Doolittle 
    The Propertarian Institute 
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • Liberty: A Distributed Dictatorship of Free Men

    Guest Post By Eli Harman

    [L]iberty can triumph because liberty is the most robust sort of authoritarianism. You can kill a king. You can corrupt a democracy. But a distributed dictatorship of free men is practically irresistible and unassailable in comparison. Its power derives from a degree of all-seeing omnipresence that exceeds even the wildest fantasies of an autocrat; yet does not detract from its adaptability, resilience or ability to react rapidly to nearly any contingency.

    ( Damn.  Very smart. -Curt.)

  • Liberty: A Distributed Dictatorship of Free Men

    Guest Post By Eli Harman

    [L]iberty can triumph because liberty is the most robust sort of authoritarianism. You can kill a king. You can corrupt a democracy. But a distributed dictatorship of free men is practically irresistible and unassailable in comparison. Its power derives from a degree of all-seeing omnipresence that exceeds even the wildest fantasies of an autocrat; yet does not detract from its adaptability, resilience or ability to react rapidly to nearly any contingency.

    ( Damn.  Very smart. -Curt.)

  • How to translate conservatism: “we were doing it right before. we’re doing it wr

    How to translate conservatism: “we were doing it right before. we’re doing it wrong now. at least we could do it right again. so lets just go back to rule of law, and the family, shall we?”

    How to translate libertinism “i don’t wanna pay the costs of the commons because my self imagined status is not rewarded by that commons, even if property rights themselves are a commons.”


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-03 13:04:00 UTC

  • PROPERTARIANISM: THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (second draft) (close

    PROPERTARIANISM: THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF GOVERNMENT

    (second draft) (closer)

    History says only that the development of a state – a monopoly bureaucracy – transfers high local transaction costs without central rents, to state rents and low transaction cost. Libertarians nearly universally ignore the evidence of universal transaction costs and free riding at the local level.

    And they further ignore the demonstrated necessity using organized violence by a monopoly organization to suppress those transaction costs and free ridings (“local rents”), and to convert them into central rents in order to pay for such suppression.

    The counter-argument is that states are in fact a neutral cost, and that we don’t spend enough on them in the suppression of transaction costs, because states provide multiples of return on that suppression. This is also demonstrable.

    The question isn’t how we can do without the state (a corporation articulated as a monopoly definition of property rights ), but now that we have suppressed local transaction costs, and replaced them with centralized rents in order to produce the commons we call property rights – how do we suppress centralized rents while maintaining the suppression of transaction costs, and the ability to construct commons that such suppression of transaction costs and rents allows us to construct?

    To argue that a monopoly definition of property rights is somehow “bad”, is irrational since property, obtained by homesteading and by voluntarily exchange, under the requirements for productivity, warranty and symmetry, is as far as I know, as logically consistent and exception-less as are mathematical operations on natural numbers. So the imposition of property rights cannot be illogical, immoral, unethical no matter how they are imposed since they define that which is logical, ethical and moral.

    There is nothing wrong whatsoever with violence – in fact, it is violence with which we pay for property rights and liberty – it is our first, most important resource in the construction of liberty. Instead, the question is purely institutional: having used violence to centralize transaction costs into rents, how do we now use violence to eliminate rents from the central organization?

    This is pretty easy: Universal standing, Universal Property rights, and Organically constructed, Common Law, predicated upon the one law of property rights as positive articulation of the prohibition on and the suppression of involuntary transfers: the demand for fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchanges free of externality. Because it is only under fully informed, productive, voluntary transfer, warrantied and free of externality that cooperation is rational, rather than parasitic. And only under rational cooperation is forgoing one’s opportunity to use violence equally rational.

    The question becomes then, who prohibits the formation of authority and this falls to the citizenry: the militia – those who possess violence.

    As far as I know this is the correct analysis of political evolution, and the correct theory for future political action.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-03 11:09:00 UTC

  • second American Revolution

    http://conservativetribune.com/marines-sign-goes-viral/The second American Revolution


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-01 07:54:00 UTC

  • “A people are less without their elites. But elites are nothing without their pe

    —“A people are less without their elites. But elites are nothing without their people. And that’s what they’re about to learn.”— Eli Harman


    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-30 13:37:00 UTC

  • Pretty happy with my stance on racism now. Ties in with paying the lower classes

    Pretty happy with my stance on racism now. Ties in with paying the lower classes for construction of capitalism (commons, property rights and the voluntary organization of production). That chapter is ready.

    Not really happy that the impetus for addressing it was provided by the kind of cop I have no respect for shooting an idiot that got out of hand. But the end is that I know how to talk about race and racism now as a solvable problem.

    Thanks all who helped.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-30 08:14:00 UTC