Curt Doolittle

Category: Natural Law and Reciprocity

  • What Constitutes Ethics?

    ETHICS: IMPROVING FUZZY LANGUAGE

    —“To be correct, ethical memes need to be universal. It cannot be right or wrong only for some but not for all. But all mere values are personal, but a value is only like a belief in that respect.”— David M.

    Excellent. I’d suggest improving this a bit.

    First:
    “All true ethical propositions must apply universally. All preferential rules need not apply universally. All preferences must exist as individual opinions. All ethical (and moral) rules must exist independent of individual opinions. “

    Second:
    The term “meme” refers to the rate of involuntary distribution. An ethical rule may be stated mimetically or not. While it is certainly more efficacious that an ethical rule be stated mimetically, the truth of the proposition holds whether it is stated mimetically or not.

    For example, most false moral statements constructed by the Frankfurt school and the postmodernists as well as many of the pseudoscientific arguments of twentieth century social science, appear to be ethical, but are not.

    Third:
    Worse, justifications for unethical and immoral actions spread fastest because they allow for rapid returns.

    CONCLUSION
    So (a) ethical rules, if true, are universal. (b) The memetic construction of an idea has no correspondence with its truth. In fact since ethical rules require us to forgo consumption, in general, they impose a cost upon us, and therefore they are constantly met with friction. This is why the common law must always evolve: we find a new way of ‘cheating’ and then must describe that form of cheating as illegal. Rules follow inventions.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • What Constitutes Ethics?

    ETHICS: IMPROVING FUZZY LANGUAGE

    —“To be correct, ethical memes need to be universal. It cannot be right or wrong only for some but not for all. But all mere values are personal, but a value is only like a belief in that respect.”— David M.

    Excellent. I’d suggest improving this a bit.

    First:
    “All true ethical propositions must apply universally. All preferential rules need not apply universally. All preferences must exist as individual opinions. All ethical (and moral) rules must exist independent of individual opinions. “

    Second:
    The term “meme” refers to the rate of involuntary distribution. An ethical rule may be stated mimetically or not. While it is certainly more efficacious that an ethical rule be stated mimetically, the truth of the proposition holds whether it is stated mimetically or not.

    For example, most false moral statements constructed by the Frankfurt school and the postmodernists as well as many of the pseudoscientific arguments of twentieth century social science, appear to be ethical, but are not.

    Third:
    Worse, justifications for unethical and immoral actions spread fastest because they allow for rapid returns.

    CONCLUSION
    So (a) ethical rules, if true, are universal. (b) The memetic construction of an idea has no correspondence with its truth. In fact since ethical rules require us to forgo consumption, in general, they impose a cost upon us, and therefore they are constantly met with friction. This is why the common law must always evolve: we find a new way of ‘cheating’ and then must describe that form of cheating as illegal. Rules follow inventions.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • What Constitutes Ethics

    WHAT CONSTITUTES “ETHICS” AND WHAT MAKES CERTAIN ETHICAL STATEMENTS UNIVERSAL? —” what constitutes ethics and what makes certain ethical values it universal?”— [C]ooperation (forgoing opportunity to use violence) is non logical under conditions of parasitism, imposed costs, or free riding. Voluntary exchange is only rational if mutually productive, and free of negative externality. Now, if one exists in a tribal family structure (say levantine or arabic) or in an outbred family structure (northern Europe), whether one is ‘free riding’ on whom may constitute different ethical preferences. One group may prefer a less moral and ethical society, and another may prefer a more moral and ethical society. In other words, in a low-trust in-bred polity (Jews, gypsies, arabs) one is expected to act on behalf of the family at all costs. (See Banfield’s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society). However, this inbreeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Emmanuel Todd) Just as jewish and Gypsy near breeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Macdonald) These groups practice dual ethical systems: high trust-in-group and low-trust out-group. Only northern europeans, who practice the absolute nuclear family, evolved high trust ethics – a total prohibition on parasitism, imposed costs, and free riding. Because only northern Europeans succeeded in breaking the family and tribal fealties through manorialism, outbreeding and property rights. It was an economic advantage for westerners to develop universalism. But that universalism independent of separatism, is uncompetitive. Ethical rules are universal. We choose a m ore ethical society or a less ethical society given the diversity or heterogeneity of the population. (Period. End of Argument. Much to the displeasure of many.) Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine

  • What Constitutes Ethics

    WHAT CONSTITUTES “ETHICS” AND WHAT MAKES CERTAIN ETHICAL STATEMENTS UNIVERSAL? —” what constitutes ethics and what makes certain ethical values it universal?”— [C]ooperation (forgoing opportunity to use violence) is non logical under conditions of parasitism, imposed costs, or free riding. Voluntary exchange is only rational if mutually productive, and free of negative externality. Now, if one exists in a tribal family structure (say levantine or arabic) or in an outbred family structure (northern Europe), whether one is ‘free riding’ on whom may constitute different ethical preferences. One group may prefer a less moral and ethical society, and another may prefer a more moral and ethical society. In other words, in a low-trust in-bred polity (Jews, gypsies, arabs) one is expected to act on behalf of the family at all costs. (See Banfield’s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society). However, this inbreeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Emmanuel Todd) Just as jewish and Gypsy near breeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Macdonald) These groups practice dual ethical systems: high trust-in-group and low-trust out-group. Only northern europeans, who practice the absolute nuclear family, evolved high trust ethics – a total prohibition on parasitism, imposed costs, and free riding. Because only northern Europeans succeeded in breaking the family and tribal fealties through manorialism, outbreeding and property rights. It was an economic advantage for westerners to develop universalism. But that universalism independent of separatism, is uncompetitive. Ethical rules are universal. We choose a m ore ethical society or a less ethical society given the diversity or heterogeneity of the population. (Period. End of Argument. Much to the displeasure of many.) Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine

  • Return on Respect for Property Rights

    [W]hat is the return on an individual’s respect for property rights?

    For him?
    For the polity?
    For man?

    We cannot construct the voluntary organization without widespread respect.

    So then how do we calculate the cost if that adherence?

    Labor has no known value except in exchange. At which point we learn its value.

    But respect for property rights, and active construction and perpetuation of them, always produces value.

    Earlier thinkers assumed that membership and participation in the market was sufficient compensation for respecting property rights.

    But this exchange was possible only because of the possibility of entry.

    In a world of mandatory inclusion, this choice no longer exists.

    In a world of marginally different productivity, where the underclasses no longer can provide useful skills, they are mandatorially included, but necessarily excluded.

    In fact, their only value is in providing instructions in the form of demand, for the organization of production to satisfy their wants and to reward producers.

    But they have nothing to exchange except constructing and maintaining the voluntary organization of production.

    This presents us with a logical contradiction. They are forcibly included but necessarily excluded.

    How do we solve this contradiction?

    Par them for services rendered, and do not pay them if they fail to render services.

    Voluntary exchange.

  • Return on Respect for Property Rights

    [W]hat is the return on an individual’s respect for property rights?

    For him?
    For the polity?
    For man?

    We cannot construct the voluntary organization without widespread respect.

    So then how do we calculate the cost if that adherence?

    Labor has no known value except in exchange. At which point we learn its value.

    But respect for property rights, and active construction and perpetuation of them, always produces value.

    Earlier thinkers assumed that membership and participation in the market was sufficient compensation for respecting property rights.

    But this exchange was possible only because of the possibility of entry.

    In a world of mandatory inclusion, this choice no longer exists.

    In a world of marginally different productivity, where the underclasses no longer can provide useful skills, they are mandatorially included, but necessarily excluded.

    In fact, their only value is in providing instructions in the form of demand, for the organization of production to satisfy their wants and to reward producers.

    But they have nothing to exchange except constructing and maintaining the voluntary organization of production.

    This presents us with a logical contradiction. They are forcibly included but necessarily excluded.

    How do we solve this contradiction?

    Par them for services rendered, and do not pay them if they fail to render services.

    Voluntary exchange.

  • Peace is an Idiot's Obsession

    Peace is an idiot’s obsession.

    [T]he only rational pursuit is the positive expression in property rights of the negative prohibition on free riding. Violence toward that end is always rational and moral. Peace is an undesirable pursuit, since it simply justifies whatever level of immorality is currently extant.

    People who pursue peace for its own sake are, if necessity, immoralists.

  • Peace is an Idiot’s Obsession

    Peace is an idiot’s obsession.

    [T]he only rational pursuit is the positive expression in property rights of the negative prohibition on free riding. Violence toward that end is always rational and moral. Peace is an undesirable pursuit, since it simply justifies whatever level of immorality is currently extant.

    People who pursue peace for its own sake are, if necessity, immoralists.

  • Peace is an Idiot's Obsession

    Peace is an idiot’s obsession.

    [T]he only rational pursuit is the positive expression in property rights of the negative prohibition on free riding. Violence toward that end is always rational and moral. Peace is an undesirable pursuit, since it simply justifies whatever level of immorality is currently extant.

    People who pursue peace for its own sake are, if necessity, immoralists.

  • Peace is an Idiot’s Obsession

    Peace is an idiot’s obsession.

    [T]he only rational pursuit is the positive expression in property rights of the negative prohibition on free riding. Violence toward that end is always rational and moral. Peace is an undesirable pursuit, since it simply justifies whatever level of immorality is currently extant.

    People who pursue peace for its own sake are, if necessity, immoralists.