To: Scott Adams(
@ScottAdamsSays
)
Regarding: “No Kings” 😉
Concept: (First principles of government)
Oddly enough:
– Assuming the persistence of the English Constitution, as the invention of the modern rule-of-law state.
– The Monarchy has no positiva rights, only negativa (veto), and more importantly, the Monarchy is “above the law in the restoration of the law” – essentially it is the highest court in the land.
– And the importance of the English constitutional monarchy, (a) the intergenerational interests of monarchies (“Owners”) are superior to the temporal interests of all factions and parties (“Renters”), and as such (b) is the only defense against the tragedy of the commons that universally destroys all rule of law and all participatory governments. (See Hoppe in Democracy, the God that Failed)
– And the failure of the English constitutional monarchy, is that unlike the US, where the people are sovereign, and the people determine the constitution, and the people’s determination of the constitution is limited to natural law (sovereignty in exchange for duty of reciprocity, truth before face, excellence, and beauty – the UK Parliament is sovereign, not the people, nor the monarchy, nor the constitution. — And until that is ‘fixed’ by a written constitution the monarchy cannot protect the people from the legislature.
– And in the USA the absence of a Monarchy (Despite Trump’s efforts to mirror one in the restoration of the law), cannot be protected from the courts, the legislature, the bureaucracy, the special interests, and the frauds and deceits of “The talking classes”.
– In a Republic, under a Constitution, under rule of law of the natural law, under the sovereignty of the people, under the empirical common law of discovered resolution of disputes, and under empirical concurrent legislation creating a market between regions, classes (and now sexes), a Monarchy as a judge of last resort, “is a good thing” because it is a necessary means of compensating for the deterministic failure of the processes of consolidating popular choice that produces deleterious outcomes that cyclically worsen over time. (See Robert Michels addressing the Iron Law of Oligarchy in The Machiavellians by Burnham)
A scholar of these matters (and there are many apologists, commentaries, and critics but few scholars) will come to the conclusion that we might add to rule of law with monarchy, add to justice with courts, add to governing with legislatures, and add houses of legislature as classes demonstrate agency and ability to bear responsibility – thereby creating a market for the production of commons.
But almost any fool will discover that one cannot substitute any of the latter for the former. Only continuously divide the labor of governance across larger numbers of people, producing a market for the production of commons regulated by a hierarchy of courts – the last of which is the monarchy as judge of last resort – prior to civil war.
The problem: small homogenous polities can preserve rule of law and participatory government because of marginal indifference in competitive wants. However, a heterogenous polity does nothing but generate demand for authority to impose costs on one group or another for the benefit of one group or another. As such heterogenous polities serve no purpose but to getherate authoritarianism to compensate for the impossibility of participation.
Cheers
Curt Doolittle
NLI
