Curt Doolittle

Category: Law, Constitution, and Jurisprudence

  • WHAT DEFINES TERRORISM? FIGHTING FOR LIBERTY IS ALWAYS JUST. –“Section 83.01 of

    WHAT DEFINES TERRORISM? FIGHTING FOR LIBERTY IS ALWAYS JUST.

    –“Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as an act committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” with the intention of intimidating the public “…with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.”–

    Bingo. It’s not Criminal (for profit) it’s Political.

    Usual argument also includes the difference between:

    1) state actors (war)

    2) state sponsored actors (insurgency)

    3) state-tolerated actors (succor)

    4) non-state, organized actors (groups)

    5) non-state, non-organized actors (individuals)

    6) non-state organized rebels (groups)

    7) non-state non-organized rebels (individuals)

    In practice we treat non-state actors as criminals and state actors as acts of war. But the problem of state-tolerated actors who are indirectly sponsored my giving them shelter has become a problem. Weak states are not capable of preventing their territory from use as a staging area. Yet the post-war consensus is predicated on the inviolability of borders. Prior theory was that states are responsible for the actions of their citizens. In practice americans, as world policemen, hold states accountable under pre-war theory. However, the academy-state complex (what some of us call the Cathedral) ideology is that we cannot hold states or citizens accountable for the actions of their peers.

    NOW WHAT ABOUT JUST AND UNJUST ACTIONS?

    Well, we can fight to implement greater or lesser liberty (property rights). This is the only question we must answer.

    SO WE HAVE THREE AXIS

    1) State vs Non State`

    2) Internal vs External

    3) Increase or Decrease free riding (trust).

    Internal or external, individual or group, and increase in liberty: moral.

    Internal or external, individual or group, and decrease in liberty: immoral.

    So the only question as to whether one is conducting war, terrorism, or revolution is whether one is attempting to increase the scope of impositions on free riding.

    Fighting for increased liberty is always just.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-23 03:17:00 UTC

  • HAYEK AND HOPPE – INSUFFICIENT Hayek is right that a condition of liberty can on

    HAYEK AND HOPPE – INSUFFICIENT

    Hayek is right that a condition of liberty can only be constructed by organically evolutionary (common) law of property. Hoppe is right that institutions can replace monopoly bureaucracy.

    However, Hayek has no solution to making such a condition universally preferable; and Hoppe has no solution to the provision of the commons, nor for constructing a condition of liberty. Neither address the influence of the family or the intergenerational means of reproductive production or the entry of women’s socialistic biases into the sphere of politics – and neither addresses the problem of the conflict between the reproductive interests of the classes. Neither solves the problem of a heterogeneous post-agrarian, and possibly post familial, institutional system. Yet that is the set of conditions that we find ourselves in.

    I think I have persuasively argued that over the long term (anyone can benefit from implementing technology that was invented by others in the sort term), high velocity economies are only possible under liberty, and that liberty is only possible under high trust, and that only law under universal standing can construct high trust and liberty, and that those most interested in maintaining this structure are those in the lower middle class and upper proletariat, who are willing to fight to un-constrain their superiors, so that they can gain the privileges of the group with the best leaders. This is why the working classes are conservatively biased – they will fall in status and material possession without the advantages given them by support – the enablement – of their elites.

    So we can look at the successes of philosophers but also look at their failures. Hoppe tries to both preserve cosmopolitan separatism and reconstruct the hanseatic league. But this is not possible without the use of violence, exclusion, and the taking of territory sufficiently advantageous to produce the incentives to join such a polity, nor the economic advantage necessary to see it persist.

    Hoppe’s solution of starting a clean polity isn’t a solution at all. It’s the equivalent of communism for libertines.

    Territory is obtained, held, informal institutions constructed, formal institutions implemented, and monuments built, by the use of violence to do so by those desirous of obtaining advantage for themselves and their people.

    Peace, is not an intrinsic good. The intrinsic good is the perpetuation of your family, tribe, and people in competition with other families tribes and peoples.

    Everything else is just a better way of getting there.

    And the alternative is conquest and suicide. Both of which we are victims of.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-21 06:41:00 UTC

  • IS A PRIVELEGE EARNED I have a problem with causing suffering as punishment or f

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/16/from-moderate-democrats-to-white-evangelicals-nearly-every-demographic-group-believes-torture-can-be-justified/?tid=sm_fbINDIVIDUALISM IS A PRIVELEGE EARNED

    I have a problem with causing suffering as punishment or for personal gratification. I have no problem with torture for the purpose of gathering information – particularly non-destructive torture. I certainly have no problem with killing, and I think we don’t do nearly enough of it. It’s cheap, effective, and provides exceptional incentives.

    Moreover, In individual societies we must limit punishment to the individual. In traditional societies, to the family, to primitive societies to the tribe, to corporeally organized to the state, and to religiously organized societies to all members.

    If you act as your own agent, for your own personal gain, then you have merely committed a crime. If you act on behalf of others you have committed a conspiracy.

    For these reasons we must hold groups accountable for the actions of their members, because actors acting on their behalf are their agents, and only those members possess the knowledge and incentives to contain the actions of their members.

    Individualism is a privilege earned by members of a society for suppression of the actions its members.

    Punish the group for the actions of the individuals and they will contain their group members – that’s what we do.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-18 02:35:00 UTC

  • Intellectual Property (IP) In Propertarianism

    [H]ere is where I end up. And it hasn’t changed much in two years.

    1) Trademarking.
    Yes. It’s a weight and measure. And it’s testable. Violating trademarks is fraudulent.

    2) Copyrighting.
    Possibly – but only if under the model of the creative commons. Meaning free for non commercial use. I don’t care about patents anywhere near as much as I care about ending copyrights on user copyable media. It is very, very, hard to argue that pop music, film and literature are a public good – and I think the evidence is the opposite.  Artists and writers will do their work regardless of compensation, and without compensation those who lack are will be dis-incentivized from producing it.

    The difference between my position on copyrighting and the rothbardian, is that since high trust is necessary for the rational voluntary formation of even a moderately anarchic polity, then the criteria for moral action necessary for a high trust society will be: “Truthfully stated, fully informed, warrantied, productive, voluntary exchange, free of negative externality” – and those criteria are violated by commercially profiting from the creative works of another.

    While it is hard to say that one should be cast as a criminal for duplicating a non-scarce good, it is another to say that one has the right to profit from it instead of its creator. It would violate the requirement that we all contribute to production rather than act parasitically in order for cooperation to be inter-temporally rational. (ie: Non-retaliatory.)

    I can’t agree that a publisher can make money selling a book without a commission to the author. But I can agree that an author cannot prevent the copying of a book. Same for film, music, and art. And I take this position not because I like it but because I cannot logically find an alternative to it. Humans will retaliate against parasitism, and that is what defines property-en-toto.

    3) Patents.
    Possibly in rare circumstances, but only for very, very, specific public (Citizen-Shareholder) investments that would not be served by the market otherwise. It is arguable that such criteria is not in fact meaningfully similar enough to a patent to call it patenting. But the idea of funding off-book research and development at private expense in hope of public reward is difficult to morally argue against – particularly in medicine and physical science. If we wanted to put a ten billion dollar bounty on the invention of a fusion reactor that met X criteria it is hard to say that wouldn’t be a good investment.

    Again, I am not sure that this qualifies as a ‘patent’, but to prohibit a voluntarily organized polity from offering a market bounty for the off book production of a high risk good is hard to find argument against.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • Intellectual Property (IP) In Propertarianism

    [H]ere is where I end up. And it hasn’t changed much in two years.

    1) Trademarking.
    Yes. It’s a weight and measure. And it’s testable. Violating trademarks is fraudulent.

    2) Copyrighting.
    Possibly – but only if under the model of the creative commons. Meaning free for non commercial use. I don’t care about patents anywhere near as much as I care about ending copyrights on user copyable media. It is very, very, hard to argue that pop music, film and literature are a public good – and I think the evidence is the opposite.  Artists and writers will do their work regardless of compensation, and without compensation those who lack are will be dis-incentivized from producing it.

    The difference between my position on copyrighting and the rothbardian, is that since high trust is necessary for the rational voluntary formation of even a moderately anarchic polity, then the criteria for moral action necessary for a high trust society will be: “Truthfully stated, fully informed, warrantied, productive, voluntary exchange, free of negative externality” – and those criteria are violated by commercially profiting from the creative works of another.

    While it is hard to say that one should be cast as a criminal for duplicating a non-scarce good, it is another to say that one has the right to profit from it instead of its creator. It would violate the requirement that we all contribute to production rather than act parasitically in order for cooperation to be inter-temporally rational. (ie: Non-retaliatory.)

    I can’t agree that a publisher can make money selling a book without a commission to the author. But I can agree that an author cannot prevent the copying of a book. Same for film, music, and art. And I take this position not because I like it but because I cannot logically find an alternative to it. Humans will retaliate against parasitism, and that is what defines property-en-toto.

    3) Patents.
    Possibly in rare circumstances, but only for very, very, specific public (Citizen-Shareholder) investments that would not be served by the market otherwise. It is arguable that such criteria is not in fact meaningfully similar enough to a patent to call it patenting. But the idea of funding off-book research and development at private expense in hope of public reward is difficult to morally argue against – particularly in medicine and physical science. If we wanted to put a ten billion dollar bounty on the invention of a fusion reactor that met X criteria it is hard to say that wouldn’t be a good investment.

    Again, I am not sure that this qualifies as a ‘patent’, but to prohibit a voluntarily organized polity from offering a market bounty for the off book production of a high risk good is hard to find argument against.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • HERE IS WHERE I END UP ON IP in PROPERTARIANISM. And it hasn’t changed much in t

    HERE IS WHERE I END UP ON IP in PROPERTARIANISM.

    And it hasn’t changed much in two years.

    1) Trademarking.

    Yes. It’s a weight and measure. And it’s testable. Violating trademarks is fraudulent.

    2) Copyrighting.

    Possibly – but only if under the model of the creative commons. Meaning free for non commercial use. I don’t care about patents anywhere near as much as I care about ending copyrights on user copyable media. It is very, very, hard to argue that pop music, film and literature is a public good – and I think the evidence is the opposite.

    The difference between my position on copyrighting and the rothbardian, is that since high trust is necessary for the voluntary formation of even a moderately anarchic polity, then the criteria for moral action necessary for a high trust society will be: “Truthfully stated, fully informed, warrantied, productive, voluntary exchange, free of negative externality” is violated by commercially profiting from the creative works of another. While it is hard to say that one should be cast as a criminal for duplicating a non-scarce good, it is another to say that one has the right to profit from it instead of its creator. It would violate the requirement that we all contribute to production rather than act parasitically in order for cooperation to be inter-temporally rational. (ie: Non-retaliatory) I can’t agree that a publisher can make money selling a book without a commission to the author. But I can agree that an author cannot prevent the copying of a book. Same for film, music, and art. And I take this position not because I like it but because I cannot logically find an alternative to it. Humans will retaliate against parasitism, and that is what defines property-en-toto.

    3) Patents.

    Possibly in rare circumstances, but only for very, very, specific public (Citizen-Shareholder) investments that would not be served by the market otherwise. It is arguable that such criteria is not in fact meaningfully similar enough to a patent. But the idea of funding off book research and development at private expense in hope of public reward is difficult to morally argue against – particularly medicine and physical science. If we wanted to put a ten billion dollar bounty on the invention of a fusion reactor that met X criteria it is hard to say that wouldn’t be a good investment.

    Again, I am not sure that this qualifies as a ‘patent’, but to prohibit a voluntarily organized polity from offering a market bounty for the off book production of a high risk good is hard to find argument against.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-17 15:13:00 UTC

  • Legal Prohibitions on Free Riding Must Expand With Minimum Friction

    [E]ntrepreneurs innovate. Property is necessary for calculation and incentives. Trust is necessary for economic velocity (rates). As complexity expands so does the means of free riding and theft, so legal prohibitions must expand in criminal, ethical, moral, conspiratorial coverage at a marginally indifferent rate from the complexity of associations in order to maintain trust and economic velocity.


    This state of affairs is only possible in homogenous polities.

  • Legal Prohibitions on Free Riding Must Expand With Minimum Friction

    [E]ntrepreneurs innovate. Property is necessary for calculation and incentives. Trust is necessary for economic velocity (rates). As complexity expands so does the means of free riding and theft, so legal prohibitions must expand in criminal, ethical, moral, conspiratorial coverage at a marginally indifferent rate from the complexity of associations in order to maintain trust and economic velocity.


    This state of affairs is only possible in homogenous polities.

  • (worth repeating) –“The whole anglo philosophical and political fantasy of equa

    (worth repeating)

    –“The whole anglo philosophical and political fantasy of equality has been a disaster for mankind. We must be equal in property rights and equal under the law, but that’s so that we may coordinate our actions as specialists, and succeed as specialists – not so that we can act as equals.”–

    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-12 04:11:00 UTC

  • The Law Must Address The Full Spectrum of Thefts

    [T]he manner of theft is immaterial. Either the court provides a means of remedy for a theft, or we are free to use violence to obtain remedy for the theft. The court does not grant what we may do. It holds provision only over those conflicts which it agrees to resolve via property rights. See Burke —-“In a state of nature, it is true, that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him. But in political society [, outside of the state of nature], a rich man may rob me in another way. [And] I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight [in political society]. If I attempt to avenge myself, the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.” -– Edmund Burke Ergo, political society fails, and juridical society succeeds.