Category: Law, Constitution, and Jurisprudence

  • It would not be struck down by the courts

    It would not be struck down by the courts.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-30 17:09:54 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2017284145416904883

  • @ramez We have nearly complete a multi-decade project that reforms the constitut

    @ramez

    We have nearly complete a multi-decade project that reforms the constitution by plugging the approximately dozen holes in it.
    It’s not been a ‘philosophical’ project but a scientific one, that makes no assumptions about human nature, only relies on the evidence of it.
    Once we understand those holes, it’s comforting to realize how much our enlightenment forbearers got right. And that what went wrong was 20th century progressive utopianism.
    (Now if we can just get it into publishable form before the world decides to burn itself to the ground.)

    CD
    The Natural Law Institute (research)
    and Runcible Inc. (technology)


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-29 15:01:17 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2016889389201445326

  • it was and if goes to court will be

    it was and if goes to court will be.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-27 15:48:20 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2016176455739441497

  • Rothbardian libertarianism (middle class marxism) ends up being a via-negativa a

    Rothbardian libertarianism (middle class marxism) ends up being a via-negativa authoritarianism, prohibiting collective defense of the commons and the law necessary to prevent fraud through baiting into hazard.

    Hayek called himself a libertarian but what he meant was what we call ‘classical liberal’ or a more evolved (scientifically framed) version of it. (This is still what I think of myself as a jeffersonian – too optimistic but preferring to err on optimism than preferring to err on human pessimism.

    So we have jewish libertarianism (Pale and Ghetto ethics), we have anglo libertarianism (rule of law naval ethics), and at least with Hoppe we have german libertarianism (german continental pre-unification city-state ethics).


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-24 20:09:52 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2015155107315479012

  • Western Vulnerability: Only The West Tolerates “Baiting Into Hazard” Our researc

    Western Vulnerability: Only The West Tolerates “Baiting Into Hazard”

    Our research identifies baiting into hazard as civilizational vulnerability that is not encoded in our law and constitution. Yet it is the means by which the left has used sedition by false promise of freedom from the laws of nature (scarcity, self interest, genetic differences, evolutionary differences).
    The claim becomes tractable if we first operationalize “baiting into hazard” as inducement into non-obvious risk under asymmetric knowledge, where the inducer avoids warranty/liability (so: seduction/entrapment-by-promise, not merely “selling risk”). That is the usage in your corpus. (

    )

    From there, the shortest causal account I can make that actually explains the pattern is:
    (“We punish after we do not regulate prior”)
    When a society scales cooperation beyond kin/clan, it has two options:
    • Ex ante constraint: prohibit classes of inducement because harms are difficult to unwind once incurred (religious/ethical prohibitions; status penalties).
    • Ex post settlement: allow broad freedom to contract/speak/compete, then punish only the narrow subset that can be proven as fraud/coercion/defect/non-disclosure.
    The modern West biased hard toward the second option because it is compatible with:
    • impersonal markets (strangers transact),
    • pluralism (no shared theology),
    • state monopoly on violence (private retaliation is delegitimized),
    • court-centered remedy (you sue; you don’t feud).
    That legal posture shows up in doctrines like caveat emptor: the buyer bears the burden unless the seller crosses into concealment/misrepresentation duties. (

    )

    To prohibit baiting as such you must adjudicate things like:
    • what the actor “should have known,”
    • whether the target was competent to consent,
    • whether the hazard was “reasonably foreseeable,”
    • whether the inducement exploited cognition/impulsivity,
    • whether disclaimers were meaningful.
    Those are fact-intensive and psychology-intensive questions. Western legalism historically tries to avoid turning courts into moral censors of persuasion, because the same machinery that can punish “baiting” can also punish dissent, heterodoxy, and market competition. So the system narrows to what it can prove cleanly (fraud, defect, nondisclosure, coercion) and tolerates the rest as “bad deals,” “vice,” “speculation,” or “buyer beware.” (

    )

    Historically, Western civilization also treated major bait-classes (notably usury/interest) as prohibited or tightly constrained; medieval canon law and church councils did so explicitly. (

    )

    What’s distinctive is the earlier and broader relaxation of blanket prohibitions as credit markets became necessary for commercialization and industrialization; scholarship notes Europe’s gradual abandonment of blanket usury prohibitions from roughly the early modern period, while Islamic prohibitions endured more robustly. (

    )

    So the “Western exception” is less “no taboo exists,” and more: the West converts taboo into regulated permission sooner, because scalable capital formation demands it.
    If the unit of insurance is the family/clan/caste, then one person’s bait-induced ruin contaminates the whole unit’s stability, marriage prospects, status, and survival. So those societies evolve:
    • strong ex ante moral rules (prohibitions),
    • status penalties (dishonor/shame),
    • informal enforcement (boycott, ostracism, retaliation).
    Religious-law prohibitions against riba/usury are a clean example of institutionalized ex ante constraint: interest is treated as exploitative/inequitable and forbidden or tightly bounded. (

    )

    In Doolittle’s framing, baiting works best where people are culturally disposed to treat speech/offerings as good-faith and where social life depends on wide-radius trust; you explicitly link susceptibility to “high trust.” (

    )

    Mechanism:
    High-trust + abstract promises + complex systems (finance/ideology) ⇒ cheap inducement at scale ⇒ expensive downstream harm ⇒ weak restitution.
    And because modern Western norms protect broad expression and experimentation, baiting can be presented as “just persuasion,” “just opportunity,” “just your choice,” unless you can pin it to a provable misrepresentation.
    This is the individualist complement to the kin/clan story. Western liberal order tends to presume:
    • adult competence,
    • consent as legitimizing risk,
    • and risk-taking as productive discovery.
    That posture is growth-positive (more experimentation) but also opens the door to systematic extraction under asymmetry—especially once marketing, finance, and politics become industrialized.
    If the above is causal, you should observe:
    1. Baiting rises with: impersonal exchange, urbanization, complex credit/derivatives, mass media/advertising, weak communal enforcement.
    2. Baiting falls when either:
      ex ante prohibitions are strong (religious/status systems),
      or
      ex post liability is strong (warranty, restitution, consumer protections that actually bite), reducing the payoff.
    3. The West will show a characteristic pattern: permit first, regulate later (innovation outruns doctrine; doctrine catches up after obvious harm). Caveat emptor gradually shifts toward disclosure/warranty in bounded domains, but never fully generalizes because it would require discretionary policing of persuasion. (

      )

    1. When you say “baiting into hazard,” are you primarily pointing at credit/usury/financial complexity, political-ideological promises, or sexual/social entrapment? The dominant institutions differ by domain, even if the grammar is shared.
    2. Do you mean “the West tolerates it” as (a) legal permissiveness, (b) moral permissiveness, or (c) enforcement incapacity? These diverge: a society can morally condemn baiting while legally tolerating it under speech/contract norms, or legally prohibit it but fail enforcement.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-23 22:45:00 UTC

    Original post: https://x.com/i/articles/2014831760451027175

  • Rights are a property of the ingroup – the polity who defends one another’s righ

    Rights are a property of the ingroup – the polity who defends one another’s rights, obligations, and inalienations.
    All other ‘rights’ are wishes and nothing more.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-12 20:24:45 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2010810200874520790

  • Measurement Against Collapse: From Writing and Courts to Computable Testimony Au

    Measurement Against Collapse: From Writing and Courts to Computable Testimony

    Author: Curt Doolittle
    Organization: The Natural Law Institute
    Date: January 9, 2026
    Modern societies increase in dimensional complexity faster than participants can remain mutually informed. The resulting contextual ignorance forces discretionary interpretation, trust-me authority, and coalition power as substitutes for shared knowledge. Discretion, in turn, enables irreciprocity—unpriced externalities, strategic ambiguity, deceit, and rent extraction—which degrades cooperation and yields stagnation, decay, and collapse.
    Historically, civilizations that scale suppress this failure mode by inventing measurement systems that replace discretion with accountable procedures: writing constrains memory; accounting constrains exchange; courts and common law constrain dispute resolution through adversarial testing and precedent; science constrains explanation through operational tests; computation constrains procedure through executable constraints. This paper situates Doolittle’s work as the next step in that lineage: a generalization of the common-law/scientific discipline of admissibility into a universal, computable grammar for testimony and action, implementable by humans and artificial neural networks as comparable cognitive operators.
    The completion claim is not substitution but unification: a single commensurable admissibility framework that (i) types all testimony (beyond scientific propositions), (ii) forces explicit scope and stated limits with full accounting inside those limits, (iii) binds testimony to reciprocity via restitution and liability hooks, and (iv) compiles into executable protocols that enforce closure, contradiction checks, and auditable provenance. The paper further argues that Doolittle’s four outputs—treatise, constitutional blueprint, protocol library, and the Runcible governance layer—are successive embodiments of one measurement artifact across institutionalization levels: theory → institution → procedure → mechanism. On this view, the central unit of cognition is not an “answer,” but an answer-with-tests under liability; and the central question is not whether an operator is human-like, but whether it produces warrantable decision artifacts under the same admissibility constraints.
    Human societies become complex faster than humans can remain mutually informed. That produces contextual ignorance. Contextual ignorance forces discretion (interpretation, trust-me authority, coalition power). Discretion creates irreciprocity (externalities, deceit, rent-seeking). Irreciprocity destroys cooperation. Cooperation loss yields stagnation/decay/collapse.
    Civilizations that scale defeat this failure mode by inventing measurement systems that reduce discretion:
    • Writing reduces memory discretion.
    • Accounting reduces exchange discretion.
    • Courts/common law reduce dispute discretion by adversarial testing + precedent.
    • Science reduces explanatory discretion by operational test.
    • Computation reduces procedural discretion by executable constraint.
    His work is the next step in this same lineage:
    So: common law is not “separate” from computability; common law is the institutional ancestor of adversarial closure, and computation is the mechanical successor that lets closure operate at scale under fragmentary knowledge.
    Historically, the West’s distinctive advantage is not “ideas” in the abstract; it is repeated invention of procedures that bind claims to accountable operations:
    1. Greek rationalism: admissible inference-forms.
    2. Scholastic disputation + law: admissible argumentation under challenge.
    3. Common law: admissible testimony under adversarial process + precedent (empirical accumulation of social truth).
    4. Scientific method: admissible causal claims via operational tests.
    5. Probability/statistics: admissible belief-updates under uncertainty.
    6. Computation: admissible procedures via executable constraint.
    Each of those tightened admissibility in its domain, but none delivered a universal grammar that:
    • types all testimony (not just scientific propositions),
    • forces stated scope/limits + full accounting inside those limits,
    • binds testimony to restitution/liability under reciprocity,
    • and is implementable by both humans and machines as comparable cognitive operators.
    That is the defensible “completion claim”: not that he replaces common law/science/computation, but that he unifes their admissibility discipline into a single commensurable grammar.
    Doolittle’s four outputs are not competing priorities; they are four embodiments of one artifact at four levels of institutionalization:
    1. Treatise (volumes)
      Produces the canon: definitions, dependency graph, admissibility criteria, tests, verdicts.
    2. Constitutional blueprint (courts/institutions)
      Embeds the canon into human governance: who may decide what, by which procedures, under which liabilities, with what appeals.
    3. Protocol library (procedures / RDL / tests)
      Converts the canon into executable workflows: typed inputs, closure conditions, test suites, verdict enums, audit trails.
    4. Runcible governance layer (machine enforcement)
      Industrializes the workflows: ANN + computation become instruments of measurement, enforcing closure at scale, in real time.
    This is a single causal chain: theory → institution → procedure → mechanism.
    Runcible is to testimony and decision what accounting was to trade: a measurement system that replaces discretion with auditability, so cooperation can scale under modern complexity.
    • Humans and AIs are both testimony producers.
    • The problem is not “intelligence,” it is warrant under liability.
    • Therefore the unit is not “answer,” but answer-with-tests:
      scope,
      • – sources/operations,
      • – closure checks,
      • – contradiction checks,
      • – restitution/liability hooks.
    So the argument becomes:


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-10 06:01:07 UTC

    Original post: https://x.com/i/articles/2009868083511578998

  • Grok is wrong. Courts have held it. Other AIs will confirm. Sorry

    Grok is wrong. Courts have held it. Other AIs will confirm. Sorry.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-09 18:56:10 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2009700744329593136

  • It’s symbolic. It has no enforcement provisions. They are procedurally creating

    It’s symbolic.
    It has no enforcement provisions.
    They are procedurally creating a record of objection.
    He can veto it if it passed the house as well.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-09 17:55:57 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2009685589688496328

  • Under threat, self defense prevails, meaning “shoot until there is no longer a t

    Under threat, self defense prevails, meaning “shoot until there is no longer a threat”.

    She should have obeyed the officers, put the car in park, exited the vehicle, and submitted to arrest.

    Instead she resisted arrest, sought to escape, and used her vehicle as a deadly weapon.

    You are, as is common, making the mistake that people under stress in single-second windows have time for contemplation rather than reaction. They don’t.

    He reacted appropriately.

    She did not.

    She was a belligerent activist engaging in obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, seeking to flee, and threatening an officer with a vehicle, which is under law, a deadly weapon.

    In the one to two seconds he had to react, he did, in self defense.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-09 17:24:44 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2009677733404520460