Author: Curt Doolittle

America is MORE western than the continent, not less. The question is why Europe’s wars led to its failure as a western civ by subservience (submission to the state), marxism (collectivism), effeminacy, and pacifism.

Definition of “Western.”
Historians treat “the West” as the synthesis of five institutional complexes:
– Greco-Roman rational inquiry and civic republicanism;
– Latin-Christian moral individualism;
– Germanic common-law constraints on rulers;
– Early-modern scientific and commercial revolutions;
– Enlightenment liberal constitutionalism.
“Westernness” therefore means persistent individualism, rule-of-law constitutionalism, rationalism, and a readiness to defend those norms by force.

Transplant without the feudal detritus.
When the English‐speaking settler elites crossed the Atlantic they imported the whole bundle—common law, Protestant ethic, private property, militia self-defence—but left behind aristocratic hierarchy and confessional state churches. The American Founders then codified those Western axioms in a written constitution, republicanized them, and fused them with frontier egalitarianism. The republic became a “freeze-dried” snapshot of classical-liberal Western civilization.

Europe’s post-1945 divergence.
After two self-inflicted civil wars (1914-18, 1939-45) and the trauma of empire’s collapse, European elites sought safety in three projects: (i) social-democratic welfare guarantees, (ii) post-national pooling of sovereignty in the EU, and (iii) pacifist reliance on American security guarantees. Cultural theorists now speak of a “post-Western Europe,” where cosmopolitan governance and hybrid civilizational identities displace the older Western self-image.

Religion and moral anthropology.
Western Christianity has always linked individual moral agency to limited government. Europe’s accelerated secularization broke that link: barely a quarter of Western Europeans say religion is “very important” in their lives, versus six in ten Americans. Pew’s comparative survey finds Americans markedly more religious, more individualistic, and less supportive of cradle-to-grave statism than Britons, French, Germans, or Spaniards. On that cultural axis the USA still looks like early-modern Europe; the continent does not.

Power politics and strategic culture.
Robert Kagan famously reduced the gap to a quip: “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Europe, cushioned by U.S. protection, embraces law, procedure, and soft power; the United States still assumes sovereign responsibility for coercive enforcement of liberal norms. The American readiness to wield hard power continues the West’s historic strategic posture from Sparta through Britain; Europe’s aversion is a departure.

Civilizational core status.
Samuel Huntington, surveying post-Cold-War alignments, designated the United States—not France or Germany—as the “core state” of Western civilization, the principal carrier of its values against rival blocs. In that taxonomy Europe is drifting toward a multi-civilizational condominium, while America retains a coherent Western identity.

Demography and migration.
Large‐scale immigration has diversified both societies, but the proportion of Muslim and African diaspora populations is an order of magnitude higher in major EU states than in the U.S., accelerating Europe’s cultural pluralization and sharpening its post-Western turn. American assimilation, still framed by a Protestant-Anglo civic creed, integrates newcomers into a recognizably Western narrative; Europe struggles with parallel communities and legal pluralism.

Net inference.
On each dimension that originally defined the West—classical-liberal institutions, individual moral agency grounded in Christianity, strategic willingness to defend order, and cultural self-confidence—the United States now scores higher than the European heartland. Historians thus argue that America functions as the conservation reserve of Western civilization, while Europe, by choice, risk, or fatigue, experiments with a post-Western civil model.

Select reference list
Gerard Delanty, “Peripheries and Borders in a Post-Western Europe,” Eurozine (2007).
Pew Research Center, “The American–Western European Values Gap” (2011).
Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (2003).
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (1993) and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

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