Curt Doolittle

Author: Curt Doolittle

  • BRAVADO Funny. Lots of posturing males in the States. Depends on class and area.

    BRAVADO

    Funny. Lots of posturing males in the States. Depends on class and area. Seattle always seemed so civilized to me compared to the rather barbaric east coast. But then, it never had the race and culture integration problems we did in the eastern cities.

    Russian and Ukrainian men are really interesting. Not a lot of time for posturing. Low barrier to ‘punching in the face’. Happens absurdly fast. First hint of threat. None of this holding and wrestling and resisting thing. Just knuckles and jaws. Lots of knockouts. No beating while he’s down.

    (I live above a pub.)

    Very polite society really.

    I love the men here. Life has such ‘clarity’. 🙂

    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 20:02:00 UTC

  • POP NEWS : ZIMMERMAN QUESTION I assume that I don’t understand something. But, i

    POP NEWS : ZIMMERMAN QUESTION

    I assume that I don’t understand something. But, if you live in a neighborhood that has gone from largely homeowners to a significant number of renters, and experienced a proportional increase in crime, and you form a block watch, and you follow someone, and he smacks you for it, and you shoot him for smacking you for just watching him, I don’t see the issue.

    If I make someone nervous who doesn’t know me my reaction is to introduce myself, state why I am there, and make them comfortable, which is what I’d want someone to do for me in the same circumstances. Its just civic duty.

    I mean, why is it ok to smack someone who is out trying to protect the neighborhood, and following you? Objecting to that is sort of an admission that you are up to something.

    Watching a person in public is not a violation of any right I’ve ever heard of. But smacking someone for watching you certainly is. And shooting someone who is smacking you for watching them seems entirely rational, since you violated his body by initiating violence.

    What don’t I understand?

    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 18:46:00 UTC

  • HOW DO WE SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS? (edited and re-posted from elsewhere) How do we

    HOW DO WE SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS?

    (edited and re-posted from elsewhere)

    How do we solve global problems of pollution, conflict, corruption, and dispute over resources?

    a) a division of knowledge and labor using private property, money prices, accounting, contracts and rule of the common law: the science of cooperation;

    b) a division of knowledge and labor using empirical tests against the natural world: the physical sciences;

    c) a division of labor using rational tests of empirical results – logic and rational philosophy bounded by philosophical realism: the science of reason;

    d) education of the willing in all of the above – cooperative, physical and rational sciences – and the economic, political and social ostracization of the unwilling.

    In other words, the prohibition of authority and the elimination of the need for homogeneity of opinion, through the use of organized and self organizing trial and error by ratio-scientific man – accompanied by the ostracization and impoverishment of the magian and totalitarian man.

    Currently we have insufficiently privatized the capital of the natural commons so that prices limit overconsumption, and we are engaging in redistribution without matching restraint on reproduction largely because of it.

    That is how we solve global problems of pollution, conflict, corruption, and dispute over resources: science and reason bounded by rules of calculation and the elimination of authority, commons and consensus.

    (oh, my, god. I think I made a funny…. Profound, but funny.)

    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 17:40:00 UTC

  • On Realism

    [W]hat is the relationship between:

      and the combination of:

        when given

          In purest terms, of course, there are limits because of necessary information loss from the process of categorization. And it certainly appears that we can use science (categories and measurements and narratives that express causal relations that are allegories to experience) to understand almost everything we desire to = eventually. But despite apparent successes, the question is whether those limits are meaningful in the context of being a human: converting extra sensual perceptions to sense perceptions. Those limits can be meaningful in at least three dimensions: a) the scope of the patterns that we can identify (which I suspect we can use machines for), b) the period of those patterns, given that causality depends on arbitrary selection of periods of regularity, c) the number of axis of causal relations that we can understand. But since our problem is knowledge for the purpose of action in real time, not ‘knowledge’ as a static absolute, and it is our actions that are limited by our ignorance, and we would not be ‘human’ without those limits, the question always seems irrational. If we understand that all thought is time-contingent based upon the knowledge at our disposal, then it’s simply illogical to even try to represent knowledge as static ‘truths’. The question itself is irrational. If the standard is ‘enough perception that we can act to achieve our ends despite the limits of our minds’ that is very different from ‘we can understand the full set of causal relations by a process of representing measures of categories, and reducing them to expressions that are possible to articulate as a narrative.’ Since, we can test our theories, and science demands that we can both test (reproduce)( and determine the boundary conditions (falsify) our theories, using science and language to extend our sense perceptions, then we can test the correspondence of our understanding of the real world. It certainly appears that we can be successful in reducing the unobservable complexity of the real world into symbolic and linguistic representations that are sufficient allegories to experience, that we can understand and at at any scale in which we an define a scheme of measurement (sensing). And there is no reason at present to believe that there is some limit to this, other than our ability to marshall the physical resources to perform tests, or because performing those tests would violate the terms of cooperation with other humans (morality). And so, as Steven says above, theories are descriptive within the state of knowledge of the moment, if they correctly express the measurements and narratives of causal relations as we understand them at the moment, because they cannot exist without the context of the forms of measurement that we used to formulate them. Those statements in fact, correspond with reality at some level of precision. So the realist expectation is that we increasingly understand the complexity of reality, but may never fully achieve it. Although that imperfection may be meaningless for the purposes of action, as long as the allegory to experience is sufficient to produce the actions in question. The generational problem affecting the discipline of philosophy is that the metaphysical assumption that we can introspectively solve these problems without the help of science is as absurd as thinking that we can solve these problems without language. The discipline of Philosophy can help us construct analogies to experience so that we may consume those analogies and ‘understand’ them. But we cannot introspectively sense, perceive, and understand much outside of human scale, without the discipline of science. Hence not only is CR a form of Realism, but it is an improvement on Realism because it does not assume that representations are static.

        • On Realism

          [W]hat is the relationship between:

            and the combination of:

              when given

                In purest terms, of course, there are limits because of necessary information loss from the process of categorization. And it certainly appears that we can use science (categories and measurements and narratives that express causal relations that are allegories to experience) to understand almost everything we desire to = eventually. But despite apparent successes, the question is whether those limits are meaningful in the context of being a human: converting extra sensual perceptions to sense perceptions. Those limits can be meaningful in at least three dimensions: a) the scope of the patterns that we can identify (which I suspect we can use machines for), b) the period of those patterns, given that causality depends on arbitrary selection of periods of regularity, c) the number of axis of causal relations that we can understand. But since our problem is knowledge for the purpose of action in real time, not ‘knowledge’ as a static absolute, and it is our actions that are limited by our ignorance, and we would not be ‘human’ without those limits, the question always seems irrational. If we understand that all thought is time-contingent based upon the knowledge at our disposal, then it’s simply illogical to even try to represent knowledge as static ‘truths’. The question itself is irrational. If the standard is ‘enough perception that we can act to achieve our ends despite the limits of our minds’ that is very different from ‘we can understand the full set of causal relations by a process of representing measures of categories, and reducing them to expressions that are possible to articulate as a narrative.’ Since, we can test our theories, and science demands that we can both test (reproduce)( and determine the boundary conditions (falsify) our theories, using science and language to extend our sense perceptions, then we can test the correspondence of our understanding of the real world. It certainly appears that we can be successful in reducing the unobservable complexity of the real world into symbolic and linguistic representations that are sufficient allegories to experience, that we can understand and at at any scale in which we an define a scheme of measurement (sensing). And there is no reason at present to believe that there is some limit to this, other than our ability to marshall the physical resources to perform tests, or because performing those tests would violate the terms of cooperation with other humans (morality). And so, as Steven says above, theories are descriptive within the state of knowledge of the moment, if they correctly express the measurements and narratives of causal relations as we understand them at the moment, because they cannot exist without the context of the forms of measurement that we used to formulate them. Those statements in fact, correspond with reality at some level of precision. So the realist expectation is that we increasingly understand the complexity of reality, but may never fully achieve it. Although that imperfection may be meaningless for the purposes of action, as long as the allegory to experience is sufficient to produce the actions in question. The generational problem affecting the discipline of philosophy is that the metaphysical assumption that we can introspectively solve these problems without the help of science is as absurd as thinking that we can solve these problems without language. The discipline of Philosophy can help us construct analogies to experience so that we may consume those analogies and ‘understand’ them. But we cannot introspectively sense, perceive, and understand much outside of human scale, without the discipline of science. Hence not only is CR a form of Realism, but it is an improvement on Realism because it does not assume that representations are static.

              • little simple but it gets the point across. Computationally, it’s really hard to

                http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/images/dimensions.gifA little simple but it gets the point across. Computationally, it’s really hard to be smarter than we are. 🙂

                Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 11:29:00 UTC

              • (PERSONAL: NOTE: EDITED FOR CLARIFICATION) Someone smarter than I am will have t

                (PERSONAL: NOTE: EDITED FOR CLARIFICATION)

                Someone smarter than I am will have to take on the burden of creating a symbolic logic of action in disequilibrium. But I suspect that we already have it, in the scientific method. And that the attempts to conjoin formal logic of certainty with critical rationalism in science are operationally distinct fields.

                That isn’t saying it’s not possible. Its saying that we haven’t done it, and that Quine’s criticism of Popper is false.

                On the other hand, it is entirely possible that I don’t understand something, since I don’t have a lot of respect for formal logic as having application to actions. And, as a political economist, and philosopher of action, my priorities are different. SInce I don’t respect it, I haven’t spent much time studying it.

                It reminds me of war games and chess. They are, to some degree Ludic fallacies. Wars are won by precisely those criteria that war games and chess present as constants: informational asymmetry: deception, misinformation, and incomplete information, combined with differences in velocity and the concentration of forces. I gave up on both those enterprises for the same reason: as structured they are puzzles not problems.

                There is a difference between puzzles and problems. I view formal logic as an interesting puzzle, but political economy as a material problem.

                This is just a preference after all. I’m not making a moral argument. I’m simply taking the position that the physical sciences and formal logic are easier to solve than economic problems. The universe equilibrates. But human beings are RED QUEENS: we are always trying to outrun it by outwitting it, and that means we must seek to create disequilibria.

                That is a different way of saying that we must constantly battle ‘the dark forces of time and ignorance’ in order to stay alive on the universe’s treadmill by seeking and creating disequliibria both with nature and with each other.

                Certainty then, in any sense, despite the ease that would bring to our minds, by obviating the constant need for problem solving, would in fact, result in our extinction.

                Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 11:17:00 UTC

              • (PERSONAL NOTE) First sketch: Contra Quine. The Physical Universe Observation (m

                (PERSONAL NOTE)

                First sketch:

                Contra Quine.

                The Physical Universe

                Observation (memory)

                Descriptive language

                The Scientific Method

                Measurement

                Mathematics

                Logic.

                Each of these is related to the one before it.

                Each loses information over the one before it.

                Rather than this hierarchy, they can be arranged on multiple axis describing various relations between them.

                But in every set of relations, information loss remains.

                Calculation in the broadest sense is impossible without information loss.

                The reason Popper’s CR is attractive is that it is a theory of action.

                It compensates for a cognitive bias all humans possess, which is that sense, perception, memory, and ‘calculation’ theorizing and planning are of necessity inductive processes, because we are always working against a kaleidic future whose state we can only approximate.

                Humans evolved to act with little information.

                When we extended our sense perception (observability) first with language and the narrative, we developed argument in the loosest terms. Second with quantitative measurements, we developed mathematics to work with objects whose scale was beyond our perception. Third we developed what we now call pure or symbolic logic to work with sets instead of quantities.

                But each of these systems launders information.

                Furthermore, we are confused by physics and fortunately countered by economics, because while the categories that we measure in the physical universe equilibrate, and we believed economies equilibrated because of prices. But it turns out, that because of flocking and schooling by induction-driven humans, that economies actually drive to disequilibrium, where they crash and people reorganize. Many small reorganizations are easy to absorb, and very large are not. ( Housing, Plague, trade routes, war. )

                There is a vast difference between symbolic logic and the logic of action for similar reasons of information loss.

                And this is the problem with both how popper argued in favor of CR in his era, and how Quine et all’s criticism is false.

                It is that the physical sciences snd the symbolic languages of logic and mathematics refer to constant categories that mirror the properties of the physical universe because ratios equilibrate in a manner identical to the physical universe wherever that universe exists independent of human action.

                But since humans act with limited information, their actions are fraught with error. In their inductions, in their, theories, in their actions and in their observations.

                The difference between poppers CR and Quine’s formal logic is that popper is inarticulately trying to give us direction given that we have made many errors of inclusion, exclusion and calculation in articulating a theory whatever its form, but our error is an error in the selection of information not an error in reasoning.

                Quines errors are many but I think they can be summed up as confusing an error in reasoning with errors of measurement, by confusing the content of statements with the categories that they are symbols of, because the simplistic set theory he is working with correlates highly with the physical universe because that universe equilibrates to a natural state, while the human race faces the unique challenge of creating disequilibria in the physical universe so that we can capture the energy available in the difference.

                I have always viewed formal logic as a tautological victorian parlor game.

                Someone smarter than i am will have to take on the burden of creating a smbolic logic of action in disequilibrium. But i suspect that we already have it, in the scientific method and that the attempts to conjoin formal logic of certainty and the critical rationalism in science are operationally distinct fields.

                Source date (UTC): 2013-07-14 08:12:00 UTC

              • The Source Of Private Property Is Violence

                [T]he source of property is the organized application of violence to create it. Even on Rothbard’s Crusoe island, the violence that creates the property of the island FOR Crusoe is provided by the barrier of the sea. (That the see is analogous to the ghetto, which is the model of rebellion rothbard was using whether he know it or not, is obvious and ironic.) But Rothbard’s logic is flawed. The correct analogy is that on an infinite flat plain evenly distributed with people, how do you create the institution of private property so that one person’s will and wisdom can concentrate capital for future production and use? By the application of violence to create that institution. Can an individual do it? Not against numbers. No individual is powerful enough. But can a group do it? Yes. A group requires another group to counter it, which produces diminishing returns for those members, who are more incentivized to also obtain property than reverse their claims. An organized group can create private property by the application of violence. The source of private property is the organized application of violence to create it. Arguments that try to justify private property by some other means, moral or utilitarian, are in fact, attempts to buy the right of private property at a deep discount. And nobody’s selling at that price. You have to rase the price pretty high. And violence is a very high price. The source of private property is violence. Private property is a right one gains in exchange for the commitment to others who share the desire for private property, to use violence to preserve private property for one and all. No other method is possible.

              • The Source Of Private Property Is Violence

                [T]he source of property is the organized application of violence to create it. Even on Rothbard’s Crusoe island, the violence that creates the property of the island FOR Crusoe is provided by the barrier of the sea. (That the see is analogous to the ghetto, which is the model of rebellion rothbard was using whether he know it or not, is obvious and ironic.) But Rothbard’s logic is flawed. The correct analogy is that on an infinite flat plain evenly distributed with people, how do you create the institution of private property so that one person’s will and wisdom can concentrate capital for future production and use? By the application of violence to create that institution. Can an individual do it? Not against numbers. No individual is powerful enough. But can a group do it? Yes. A group requires another group to counter it, which produces diminishing returns for those members, who are more incentivized to also obtain property than reverse their claims. An organized group can create private property by the application of violence. The source of private property is the organized application of violence to create it. Arguments that try to justify private property by some other means, moral or utilitarian, are in fact, attempts to buy the right of private property at a deep discount. And nobody’s selling at that price. You have to rase the price pretty high. And violence is a very high price. The source of private property is violence. Private property is a right one gains in exchange for the commitment to others who share the desire for private property, to use violence to preserve private property for one and all. No other method is possible.