Curt Doolittle

Author: Curt Doolittle

  • AS ADAPTATION TO CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION I wanted to respond to J

    http://johnquiggin.com/2014/02/15/the-tooth-fairy-and-the-traditionality-of-modernityMYTHOLOGY AS ADAPTATION TO CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION

    I wanted to respond to John Quiggin’s wonderful post on the ‘traditionality’ of modernity.

    –“The traditionality of modernity: It’s striking, if you’re not aware of it already, to observe that Christmas, as we now know it, was invented in the 20 years or so between 1840 and 1860, However, what is even more striking that it’s barely altered in the succeeding 150 years. Even the complaints haven’t changed in decades.

    And what’s true of Christmas is true of most of the favourite examples of invented tradition. Clan tartans were invented out of whole cloth (as it were), as soon as the actual clans had been destroyed by the Clearances, but this process was pretty much complete by 1850, and the system is now as inflexible as if the Scots wha’ wi’ Wallace bled had done so in defence of a dress code. Moreover, at 150 years or more of age, these traditions really can claim to be ancient (at least in the eyes of a non-indigenous Australian).

    A variety of cultural niches, once subject to the cycles of fashion, seem now to have been filled once and for all. Elvis, Marilyn Monroe and James Dean have all been dead for decades, but all are more instantly recognisable than any putative successor.

    More significant institutions show the same kind of stability. Political systems and national boundaries are becoming more stable over time, not less. The collapse of the Soviet Empire led to the breakup of some federal states, but nothing like the wholesale resurgence of irredentist claims predicted by many.

    One obvious factor assisting all this is technology. Just as printing has fixed languages once and for all, radio, TV and recorded music and video have a powerful effect in fixing cultural traditions of all kinds. Of course, this is the opposite of the usual story in which technology drives us to a postmodern condition of constant change. But that’s enough for me. It’s time to see what’s on at the (75-year-old) Commonwealth Games.”–

    MY RESPONSE

    1) The Structure of Production (Industrial Revolution) determines demand for mythos, morals, ethics.

    2) The high point of English civilization (Victorian) looked to the past for a new identity and found it’s pagan origins (starting with the collection of ancient fairy tales)

    3) The Germans as well tried to create a new mythos (example is Nietzsche and Wagner).

    4) These two efforts almost succeeded in reversing the christianization of Europe. And would have, had the communists, socialists and marxists not produced a greater incentive to build a new mythos around the state.

    5) Christmas evolved and was commericalized with santa clause because people celebrated their new ability to consume cheap industrial goods. Christmas will likely persist as long as this does not change, because all the incentives for it to persist remain.

    5) Elvis etc: These characters have no durability, and will not survive past the 100 year marker (the roman Saeculum). However, the mythos that they represented, again was an alteration in the structure of production: the addition of the middle and upper proletariat into the consumer class in the postwar era.

    6) My long term bet is that your last comment on boundaries is wrong. Those boundaries were made possible by the finances of the nation state, during a period of rapid change in world power structures, and the invention of industrialized total war. I am pretty sure the englightenment and socialist programs are coming close to an end, becuase the experiments with democracy and social democracy conflict with heterogeneous populations. If, as northern europeans had outbred,our large corporate-states (to distinguish them from nation states) outbred, then that would mean these boundaries will persist. However, it appears that not only do populations fail to integrate, but that the friction overwhelms the democratic political process wherever we try to use it. (We failed to understand that europeans have been a genetially homogenous people for thousands of years, and our ‘differences’ marginally indifferent so to speak.)

    So my rough guess, is that starting between 2020 and 2025, (or, it’s starting now) we will see rapid alteration of borders and governments for a period of as long as one hundred years.

    AT that point the incentives that were created by the industrial revolution, and the relative wealth of that made less social friction possible, will have been exhausted by the near elimination of the value of labor, and pervasive demand for the restructuring of status signals, politics, and the legal structure that supports production in that new context.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-02-15 05:46:00 UTC

  • Against Ideal Worlds

    1) I think it is a philosophical error (or at least naivety, and possibly profound arrogance) to think in terms of ideal worlds. I tend to think in terms of improving the world we live in, without causing externalities that negate the improvement. It is the latter part of that statement that changes philosophy from an interesting parlor game to one of consequence. 2) I think the purpose of philosophy is to integrate expansions in scientific understanding into our current understanding of the world, such that we improve our ability to reason and act in such a way as to take superior advantage of the difference between our rate of change and the universe’s suite of constant relations. 3) I think value claims are normative. In my work, I have found that if one looks at a) the structure of production b) the structure of reproduction (family) c) the class and status of the extended family d) the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the polity. e) the gender and generation of the individuals. That moral biases are predictable portfolios that reflect our reproductives strategies. 4) I think we can agree on means but not ends. And if we could agree upon ends, we increase fragility and risk. But that said, it is non-rational to expect one group to sacrifice its reproduction for another group’s reproduction. And people demonstrate this universally in all polities (at least over time.) As such I see the only ‘good’ as creating sufficient prosperity, and maintaining it, so that we are all wealthy enough to obtain what we desire individually or in small groups, but certainly not en masse. And neither equality nor diversity assist us in this objective. And that is demonstrably empirical, and very difficult to refute without selective reasoning. If it stands that women are at maximum density in one sector or other the economy, then that is the optimum best for all, because any other arrangement, whether prohibited from their potential, or prohibiting some male from his potential, is detrimental to the fulfillment of all potentials. That is, unless, you feel one of the luxuries that we can afford, is false status signals. An that is a valid preference. It may be that we prefer to create certain false signals because we are wealthy enough to do so. The problem is in anticipating the externalizes (consequences) of such false signals. And whether one or many have the right to involuntarily cause others sacrifice for self benefit.

  • Against Ideal Worlds

    1) I think it is a philosophical error (or at least naivety, and possibly profound arrogance) to think in terms of ideal worlds. I tend to think in terms of improving the world we live in, without causing externalities that negate the improvement. It is the latter part of that statement that changes philosophy from an interesting parlor game to one of consequence. 2) I think the purpose of philosophy is to integrate expansions in scientific understanding into our current understanding of the world, such that we improve our ability to reason and act in such a way as to take superior advantage of the difference between our rate of change and the universe’s suite of constant relations. 3) I think value claims are normative. In my work, I have found that if one looks at a) the structure of production b) the structure of reproduction (family) c) the class and status of the extended family d) the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the polity. e) the gender and generation of the individuals. That moral biases are predictable portfolios that reflect our reproductives strategies. 4) I think we can agree on means but not ends. And if we could agree upon ends, we increase fragility and risk. But that said, it is non-rational to expect one group to sacrifice its reproduction for another group’s reproduction. And people demonstrate this universally in all polities (at least over time.) As such I see the only ‘good’ as creating sufficient prosperity, and maintaining it, so that we are all wealthy enough to obtain what we desire individually or in small groups, but certainly not en masse. And neither equality nor diversity assist us in this objective. And that is demonstrably empirical, and very difficult to refute without selective reasoning. If it stands that women are at maximum density in one sector or other the economy, then that is the optimum best for all, because any other arrangement, whether prohibited from their potential, or prohibiting some male from his potential, is detrimental to the fulfillment of all potentials. That is, unless, you feel one of the luxuries that we can afford, is false status signals. An that is a valid preference. It may be that we prefer to create certain false signals because we are wealthy enough to do so. The problem is in anticipating the externalizes (consequences) of such false signals. And whether one or many have the right to involuntarily cause others sacrifice for self benefit.

  • Luxury vs Necessity In Ethics: Parlor Games vs Politics

      The difference between the structure of my arguments, and the more common of those in moral philosophy, is one that is common in western philosophy. Because western philosophy was created and developed by its aristocratic classes, and those classes that performed sufficiently to afford the luxury of philosophy, and sought enfranchisement. Namely: necessity. Marx, for all his error, does not make this mistake, nor does perhaps our most influential moral philosopher: Adam Smith against whom Marx, like Freud against Nietzsche, Marx is a reactionary. So, the difference in our approaches to philosophy, is that I start with necessity, and then choose preference from the available options. From that position I take the mutually moral and scientific requirements that (a) it is only moral to compel necessities not preferences. (b) the only moral preferential political action is one that others voluntarily comply with. (c) the evidence is that most of our attempts to interfere with social orders, other than increasing participation in them, has proven to be a failure when we attempt to achieve ends, rather than provide means. There are many preferences that we could seek to pursue, the externalities of which are counter productive to the prosperity that decreases the possibility of choices. As such, philosophical discourse on luxuries is interesting. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that what we are discussing is the luxuries that our implementation of necessities has made possible. Discussing luxuries is a nice parlor game. It is like young men fantasizing about which supercar they can buy if they save for the next ten years. But I do not work on philosophy for entertainment. I work on it for the purpose of identifying possible solutions to looming problems: what is necessary for continued expansion of our ability to cooperate in a division of knowledge and labor so vast that we can exist with such wealth?

  • Luxury vs Necessity In Ethics: Parlor Games vs Politics

      The difference between the structure of my arguments, and the more common of those in moral philosophy, is one that is common in western philosophy. Because western philosophy was created and developed by its aristocratic classes, and those classes that performed sufficiently to afford the luxury of philosophy, and sought enfranchisement. Namely: necessity. Marx, for all his error, does not make this mistake, nor does perhaps our most influential moral philosopher: Adam Smith against whom Marx, like Freud against Nietzsche, Marx is a reactionary. So, the difference in our approaches to philosophy, is that I start with necessity, and then choose preference from the available options. From that position I take the mutually moral and scientific requirements that (a) it is only moral to compel necessities not preferences. (b) the only moral preferential political action is one that others voluntarily comply with. (c) the evidence is that most of our attempts to interfere with social orders, other than increasing participation in them, has proven to be a failure when we attempt to achieve ends, rather than provide means. There are many preferences that we could seek to pursue, the externalities of which are counter productive to the prosperity that decreases the possibility of choices. As such, philosophical discourse on luxuries is interesting. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that what we are discussing is the luxuries that our implementation of necessities has made possible. Discussing luxuries is a nice parlor game. It is like young men fantasizing about which supercar they can buy if they save for the next ten years. But I do not work on philosophy for entertainment. I work on it for the purpose of identifying possible solutions to looming problems: what is necessary for continued expansion of our ability to cooperate in a division of knowledge and labor so vast that we can exist with such wealth?

  • Labor Is Meaningless – Consumers Are Not

      Obvious but interesting, is that marxist labor theory of value, and even their supposed social value of ‘labor’ are both in fact valueless and non-logical. But the presence of a ‘consumer’ is not. It’s not that business value labor. It’s that business and capitalists need CUSTOMERS in order to organize production. The challenge in expanding any economy, and in the satisfaction of consumer wants, is not production – it is voluntarily organization production for the satisfaction of demonstrated consumer wants. Money supplies us with information that represents the accumulated savings of time, created by the division of knowledge and labor. I know this is pretty obvious (and incomplete as an argument) but I still am amazed at how the marxist zombie simply continues to walk the face of the earth.

  • Labor Is Meaningless – Consumers Are Not

      Obvious but interesting, is that marxist labor theory of value, and even their supposed social value of ‘labor’ are both in fact valueless and non-logical. But the presence of a ‘consumer’ is not. It’s not that business value labor. It’s that business and capitalists need CUSTOMERS in order to organize production. The challenge in expanding any economy, and in the satisfaction of consumer wants, is not production – it is voluntarily organization production for the satisfaction of demonstrated consumer wants. Money supplies us with information that represents the accumulated savings of time, created by the division of knowledge and labor. I know this is pretty obvious (and incomplete as an argument) but I still am amazed at how the marxist zombie simply continues to walk the face of the earth.

  • Metaphysics vs Science

    (worth reading) –“Curt, loved your brief defense of praxeology earlier on (below). This is off subject but like Katherine, I too am curious in what way metaphysics failed and science is now close to triumph. An example or two please? We can go off line if you like.”– Pat Pat, This is the largest and most controversial topic in philosophy. And I find that I lose pretty much everyone when I try to address it. So I don’t think I can do it in a couple of examples. I can given an analogy between the problems of constructive/intuitional­ mathematics, the requirements for scientific argument (which are moral constraints actually), the problem of inconstant relations in economics, and the difference between truth and proof. And that forms a basic language for discussion. Since that conversation requires a pretty exhaustive knowledge of multiple disciplines It seems that the argument is quite hard to make even if done in long form. BUT TRYING ANYWAY The best I can do is state that imagination can only be tested by action – external correspondence. And our understanding of of our actions tested by internal consistency. And the veracity of our internal consistency by our understanding of construction. As such, our logical methods allow us to construct instruments which assist us in testing correspondence, internal consistency, and construction. Albeit, while internal consistency can be expressed in complete terms, neither external correspondence nor construction can be. Without such instruments to extend our perception, memory, and calculability, we lack the ability of sufficient introspection, and the ability of sufficient external perception, to perceive the internal and external world, at the SCALE of those action that we require for cooperating in large numbers, in a vast division of knowledge and labor – the sum of which constantly reduces the cost in calories and time of the production of goods and services which serve our reproductive interests and perpetuation as a species. This is why ratio-scientific societies outperform magian and allegorical societies: because the constancy of their efforts in correspondence with physical and social reality allows them to take better advantage of physical reality and to cooperate at scale for the production of goods and services. So, since the above statements effectively reflect the scientific method, then the scientific method is not constrained to ‘science’ per say, but it is the only method by which we can improve our actions. ergo: the scientific method is ‘the method’ of philosophy. Now, this does not mean that allegorical language (mysticism, religion, mythology, the narrative) have no pedagogical value. They do because we cannot teach the young any other way. It does not mean that Obscurant language (deception) such as is used by the continentals as a means of maintaining loading and framing, and therefore simply preserving christianity and authoritarianism in new form, is impossible or will not succeed in achieving those desires. It does mean that achieving those desires through obscurantism, deception, framing other than by means of correspondence, will produce negative economic, social and political consequences, because of their failure to correspond to reality. -Curt

  • Metaphysics vs Science

    (worth reading) –“Curt, loved your brief defense of praxeology earlier on (below). This is off subject but like Katherine, I too am curious in what way metaphysics failed and science is now close to triumph. An example or two please? We can go off line if you like.”– Pat Pat, This is the largest and most controversial topic in philosophy. And I find that I lose pretty much everyone when I try to address it. So I don’t think I can do it in a couple of examples. I can given an analogy between the problems of constructive/intuitional­ mathematics, the requirements for scientific argument (which are moral constraints actually), the problem of inconstant relations in economics, and the difference between truth and proof. And that forms a basic language for discussion. Since that conversation requires a pretty exhaustive knowledge of multiple disciplines It seems that the argument is quite hard to make even if done in long form. BUT TRYING ANYWAY The best I can do is state that imagination can only be tested by action – external correspondence. And our understanding of of our actions tested by internal consistency. And the veracity of our internal consistency by our understanding of construction. As such, our logical methods allow us to construct instruments which assist us in testing correspondence, internal consistency, and construction. Albeit, while internal consistency can be expressed in complete terms, neither external correspondence nor construction can be. Without such instruments to extend our perception, memory, and calculability, we lack the ability of sufficient introspection, and the ability of sufficient external perception, to perceive the internal and external world, at the SCALE of those action that we require for cooperating in large numbers, in a vast division of knowledge and labor – the sum of which constantly reduces the cost in calories and time of the production of goods and services which serve our reproductive interests and perpetuation as a species. This is why ratio-scientific societies outperform magian and allegorical societies: because the constancy of their efforts in correspondence with physical and social reality allows them to take better advantage of physical reality and to cooperate at scale for the production of goods and services. So, since the above statements effectively reflect the scientific method, then the scientific method is not constrained to ‘science’ per say, but it is the only method by which we can improve our actions. ergo: the scientific method is ‘the method’ of philosophy. Now, this does not mean that allegorical language (mysticism, religion, mythology, the narrative) have no pedagogical value. They do because we cannot teach the young any other way. It does not mean that Obscurant language (deception) such as is used by the continentals as a means of maintaining loading and framing, and therefore simply preserving christianity and authoritarianism in new form, is impossible or will not succeed in achieving those desires. It does mean that achieving those desires through obscurantism, deception, framing other than by means of correspondence, will produce negative economic, social and political consequences, because of their failure to correspond to reality. -Curt

  • The Philosophical Difference Between Necessity for Means vs Preference For Ends

      The difference between my set of statements and the various replies above, is one that is common in western philosophy. Because western philosophy was created and developed by its aristocratic classes, and those classes that performed sufficiently to afford the luxury of philosophy, and sought enfranchisement. Namely: necessity. Marx, for all his error, does not make this mistake, nor does perhaps our most influential moral philosopher: Adam Smith against whom Marx, like Freud against Nietzsche, is a reactionary. So, the difference in our approaches to philosophy, is that I start with necessity, and then choose preference from the available options. From that position I take the mutually moral and scientific requirements that: (a) it is only moral to compel necessities not preferences. (b) The only moral preferential political action is one that others voluntarily comply with. (c) the evidence is that most of our attempts to interfere with social orders, other than increasing participation in them, has proven to be a failure when we attempt to achieve ends, rather than provide means. There are many preferences that we could seek to pursue, the externalities of which are counter productive to the prosperity that decreases the possibility of choices. As such, philosophical discourse on luxuries is interesting. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that what we are discussing is the luxuries that our implementation of necessities has made possible. Discussing luxuries is a nice parlor game. It is like young men fantasizing about which supercar they can buy if they save for the next ten years. But I do not work on philosophy for entertainment. I work on it for the purpose of identifying possible solutions to looming problems: what is necessary for continued expansion of our ability to cooperate in a division of knowledge and labor so vast that we can exist with such wealth?