Author: Curt Doolittle

THE CONDUCT OF EASTERN EUROPEAN FOURTH GENERATION WAR

There is a limited but fairly extensive literature on infantry tactics – the kind of things ordinary soldiers need to do in 20th century armies. In that literature, the primary objective has been to get the US military to abandon pre-vietnam military structures in favor of higher reliance on skilled and equipped infantry, and less on complex weapons systems.

Moreover, since 1990, the literature has been advocating means of fighting insurgents, and now islamists, who use decentralized “4gw” (Fourth generation warfare). Meaning, the fourth generation signifies the nation states’ loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. Or as we anti-statists would argue, the post-state era is upon us because militias with machine guns and RPG’s selecting targets of opportunity can effectively crush any concentration of armed forces. Modern economies are fragile and the nation state cannot survive long term insurrections.

The problem with the literature is that it does not address how to ACT like a 4GW opponent – only how to defend against them. When I read these manuals, they seem very antique. They are manuals for soldiers not warriors. In the sense that soldiers patrol territories, in order to create order, while warriors conduct raids in order to destabilize economy, infrastructure, and daily life.

If you are an eastern european, you need to have a few nuclear weapons to keep Russia at bay (Russia being the most concentrated civilization of white people, and reliant on concentration of forces), and a very inexpensive military, which consists of a militia that can readily get access to RPG’s and AK47’s and warm clothing and rations. Ukraine would benefit from the regimental system, wherein good leaders could recruit talent, and the central government would only need to ensure that they had access to USA-style national guard armories. This is an inexpensive and unstoppable form of military order on the swiss model.

All of that boils down to a mixture of the swiss and american reserve models, with more frequent training for the men in the american model, and a reliance on infantry tactics and militia in the swiss model. Ukraine is a larger territory and supply lines for the militia are more challenging. However, a decentralized militia, skilled in 4gw themselves, rather than the US/NATO 3gw, attacking not in concentration, but against weakness would make eastern europeans nearly impervious to Russian conquest – just as Afghanistan was.

The problem is, that the manual for conducting such a military does not exist, and must be written. Strangely enough, the Islamists are writing it for us. And it is a much more bloody form of warfare, more suited to the warriors, personal grievances and close relations of regiments than the slave labor and cautious patrolling of NATO military training.

I do not need more work to do unfortunately. I have enough of it. I have enough for two of me, and one more project is more than I can manage.

NOTE: The swiss strategy is to make attempts to occupy or conquer Switzerland extremely costly in men and machines. They rely upon an almost entirely militial military. Professional soldiers constitute about 5 percent of military personnel and the rest are male conscripts 19 to 34 (but in some cases up to 50) years old. The soldiers keep their own equipment, including all personally assigned weapons, at home. Military service is compulsory for all male Swiss citizens, and women serve voluntarily. About two-thirds of young Swiss men are found suitable for service, while alternative service exists for those found unsuitable. Annually, approximately 20,000 persons are trained in basic training for a duration from 18 to 21 weeks.