Curt Doolittle

Author: Curt Doolittle

  • More Examples of Arguing With Well Intentioned But Misguided Folk

    –Still not a peep about: “Even though it is perfectly true and perfectly logical that humans are subjective beings there are some who cannot fathom a scientific subjective methodology.”– Bruce Koerber

    [T]he question is not whether we can practice a subjective methodology. Nor is it honest to use psychologism as a criticism when the question is whether such a method is a logical possibility or is empirically demonstrable. (It is dishonest actually – and psychological criticism is immoral because it is dishonest.) Instead, the question is whether subjectivity yields results – empirically it doesn’t, empirically it hasn’t, and logically it can’t. This is because of a tragically simple reason: subjective testing is not axiomatic in that it is complete (the distinguishing property of an axiom). But it is instead, that economic laws, constitute “laws” (in the spectrum of intuition, hypothesis, theory and law) meaning that it they are general rules of limited precision, widely accepted, that we cannot find false.

    We can certainly TEST economic statements. But we cannot deduce economic phenomenon, nor can we observe economic phenomenon, particularly emergent economic phenomenon, without empirical methods. We can test data all day long. We do.

    The logical possibility does not exist. We cannot and do not imagine (deduce) economic phenomenon, because economic phenomenon are emergent and inter-temporally equilibrating without every reaching equilibrium. Man is also fraught with an increasing number of cognitive biases. In other words, those phenomenon are too complicated to observe and predict. This is why there are so many outstanding problems in economic theory – it’s terribly complicated.

    So the unique property of economics is that we can test first principles (human subjectivity),rather than resort to purely correlative tests. In this sense we can know if economic theories can be true, in a way that we cannot know if theories in other science can be true. And even if we know that they CAN be true, we do not know if they are ‘true’ in the metaphysical sense, of being the most parsimonious theory possible.

    We can for example, construct a mathematica proof given any set of axioms. this mathematical proof demonstrates that any mathematical expression is can be constructed using mathematical operations. We can also demonstrate a proof in economics if any economic statement can be constructed from sympathetically testable existentially possible, human operations. But mathematical models cannot demonstrate innovation due to self awareness, and intentionally bend or break axioms in order to satisfy self interest – but humans can, and do – that is what even Keyensian economics combined with trade, fiscal and monetary policy attempt to do – and successfully do.

    It is therefore immoral and unscientific (an abuse of science) to claim that economic theories that are not operationally tested are true and moral. Whether we use empirical methods to observe and test our observations of economic phenomenon is merely a necessity of observation, and a necessity of compensating for our cognitive biases that forever jaundice our reason.

    There is no exit from the above box. Sorry.

    (Plenty of ‘peeps’ in there.)

  • An Example of Confusing Positivism and Empiricism

    —“Empirical science requires controlled experiments. In economics no such experiments are possible. Even in physics the study of a lone particle does not give us enough information to predict its movement in a many-particle environment, which is basically indeterminate.”– Shivank

    [I]ntelligent response, thanks. But common errors.

    You are confusing Empiricism with Positivism (which is a common fallacy of libertine argument). Empiricism requires observation (sense experience); and measurement is an operational means of ensuring our observations are not as erroneous, biased, or deceptive as they would be without measurements (operationalism). Just as we can observe red shift in physics, we can observe economic phenomenon by means of the measurements (recorded monetary transactions). Furthermore,

    (a) while controlled experiments are helpful in the ascertainment of first principles (reductions), we know the first principles of human cooperation: we can sympathize with intent. We cannot likewise intuit the operations of the physical world – although we seem to be able to model it at various levels of precision. And;

    (b) property rights and rule of law are experiments in economics, and so are fiscal, monetary and trade policy. And we can, and do, experiment and observe them and the emergent (complex and unpredictable) effects non-neutral, pre-equilibration effects of those policies. Also;

    (c) I agree that local phenomenon are kaliedic, and that economic phenomenon equilibrate (are largely neutral). But that does not mean that the effects of actions do not produce consequences that influence the organization and rates of equilibration of the ‘particles’ (people). And finally;

    (d) we can construct theoretical models from economic laws. We cannot construct axiomatic models from economic axioms. This is because in any axiomatic (prescriptive) system all information is present, while in all theoretical (descriptive) systems, information is always incomplete.

    And so it is either erroneous or disingenuous to state that real world (incomplete) models, are identical to imaginary (complete) models. Even geometry failed Mises’ test: length was not what we thought it was at very great or very small scale.

    So while complete, prescriptive, axiomatic systems, and incomplete, descriptive, theoretical systems, are are similar – analogous – they are not identical. Deduction is possible in an axiomatic system, but such deduction is not possible in a system of laws with an equal level of precision. This is because in an axiomatic system, the principle of arbitrary precision remains constant, while in a theoretic system, the principle of arbitrary precision does not remain constant – local variation due to dynamic interaction in real time, as you suggest, produces kaleidic results, and attempts at measurement influence the the outcome.

    It is not that economic phenomenon cannot be stated as laws. It is that emergent phenomenon cannot be deduced from the axioms in economics for precisely the reasons you suggest that mises is correct. This is why economics is an empirical science just like any other science: because science is a set of moral constraint upon us, independent of the subject matter, in an attempt to eliminate error, bias, and deception. And Mises’ himself makes fairly significant errors in conflating the prescriptive, logical, axiomatic and deterministic, with the descriptive, theoretical, empirical and kaleidic.

    Mises was ostracized from economics for reasons. They were good reasons. He embraced pseudoscience.

    Ergo, my argument stands.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    L’viv Ukraine.

  • An Example of Confusing Positivism and Empiricism

    —“Empirical science requires controlled experiments. In economics no such experiments are possible. Even in physics the study of a lone particle does not give us enough information to predict its movement in a many-particle environment, which is basically indeterminate.”– Shivank

    [I]ntelligent response, thanks. But common errors.

    You are confusing Empiricism with Positivism (which is a common fallacy of libertine argument). Empiricism requires observation (sense experience); and measurement is an operational means of ensuring our observations are not as erroneous, biased, or deceptive as they would be without measurements (operationalism). Just as we can observe red shift in physics, we can observe economic phenomenon by means of the measurements (recorded monetary transactions). Furthermore,

    (a) while controlled experiments are helpful in the ascertainment of first principles (reductions), we know the first principles of human cooperation: we can sympathize with intent. We cannot likewise intuit the operations of the physical world – although we seem to be able to model it at various levels of precision. And;

    (b) property rights and rule of law are experiments in economics, and so are fiscal, monetary and trade policy. And we can, and do, experiment and observe them and the emergent (complex and unpredictable) effects non-neutral, pre-equilibration effects of those policies. Also;

    (c) I agree that local phenomenon are kaliedic, and that economic phenomenon equilibrate (are largely neutral). But that does not mean that the effects of actions do not produce consequences that influence the organization and rates of equilibration of the ‘particles’ (people). And finally;

    (d) we can construct theoretical models from economic laws. We cannot construct axiomatic models from economic axioms. This is because in any axiomatic (prescriptive) system all information is present, while in all theoretical (descriptive) systems, information is always incomplete.

    And so it is either erroneous or disingenuous to state that real world (incomplete) models, are identical to imaginary (complete) models. Even geometry failed Mises’ test: length was not what we thought it was at very great or very small scale.

    So while complete, prescriptive, axiomatic systems, and incomplete, descriptive, theoretical systems, are are similar – analogous – they are not identical. Deduction is possible in an axiomatic system, but such deduction is not possible in a system of laws with an equal level of precision. This is because in an axiomatic system, the principle of arbitrary precision remains constant, while in a theoretic system, the principle of arbitrary precision does not remain constant – local variation due to dynamic interaction in real time, as you suggest, produces kaleidic results, and attempts at measurement influence the the outcome.

    It is not that economic phenomenon cannot be stated as laws. It is that emergent phenomenon cannot be deduced from the axioms in economics for precisely the reasons you suggest that mises is correct. This is why economics is an empirical science just like any other science: because science is a set of moral constraint upon us, independent of the subject matter, in an attempt to eliminate error, bias, and deception. And Mises’ himself makes fairly significant errors in conflating the prescriptive, logical, axiomatic and deterministic, with the descriptive, theoretical, empirical and kaleidic.

    Mises was ostracized from economics for reasons. They were good reasons. He embraced pseudoscience.

    Ergo, my argument stands.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    L’viv Ukraine.

  • What Does “Kaleidic” Mean? (In Economics)

    –“As a propertarian I’m assuming you follow the Lachmann rather than Shackle tradition in your appreciation of kaleidics.”— Chris Shaeffer


    (Note For Readers: Kaleidic, as used by Shackle, refers to the way groups and individuals in an economy rearrange, much like a kaleidoscope image, into new patterns – constantly, in response to changes, demand, innovations and shocks.  However, the term also implies that this process is unpredictable: uncertain. But this is just the first of three metaphors.  The second is flocking-and-schooling: an analogy to how fish and birds move in response to external stimuli. Humans flock and school toward opportunities and then groups break off if better opportunities present themselves, and the whole group splits in multiple directions when circumstances radically change.  The third metaphor, and the most concrete, by Arnold Kling, is “Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade”, or “PSST”, which reminds us of the stickiness of relationships in the economy, the high cost of organizing them, and the high cost of changing them.   I try to use all three of these metaphors depending upon whether I am talking about uncertainty (kaleidic),  costs (PSST), or psychology (flocking and schooling).   However, the term Kaleidic was used by Lachmann to refer to the fact that the economy does not ever fully equilibrate and eliminate all possibility of profit. But it does tend to move toward efficiency that minimizes profit.)

    [G]reat question.

    I use the term ‘Kaleidic’ primarily in the broader sense as “indeterministic”, and less frequently in the narrower sense “never reaching equilibrium” or “never reaching neutrality” in which profits are no longer possible. And in practice I follow Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Arnold Kling more closely than either Shackle or Lachmann in the cause for indeterminism: that shocks are more influential than regularities (Taleb), and that rather than Lachman’s argument, flocking and schooling (in my terms) or more precisely, “Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade” due to changing opportunities rather than ‘mechanical rearranging’, and that informational asymmetry, opportunity costs, transaction costs, are less meaningful. In other words, I see opportunities as more frequent and influential than frictions. This is because the costs of increasing efficiency are often higher than the cost of seizing new opportunities in a dynamic economy. As such, companies ‘sort’ by which tactic they are able to pursue.

    Cost cutting hurts your allies (employees). Which hurts you. And amateur Austrian economists treat human relationships (alliances) as a funglible resource, when, as dynamism increases, people are the most expensive, least predictive, and most influential resource you can possess.


  • What Does “Kaleidic” Mean? (In Economics)

    –“As a propertarian I’m assuming you follow the Lachmann rather than Shackle tradition in your appreciation of kaleidics.”— Chris Shaeffer


    (Note For Readers: Kaleidic, as used by Shackle, refers to the way groups and individuals in an economy rearrange, much like a kaleidoscope image, into new patterns – constantly, in response to changes, demand, innovations and shocks.  However, the term also implies that this process is unpredictable: uncertain. But this is just the first of three metaphors.  The second is flocking-and-schooling: an analogy to how fish and birds move in response to external stimuli. Humans flock and school toward opportunities and then groups break off if better opportunities present themselves, and the whole group splits in multiple directions when circumstances radically change.  The third metaphor, and the most concrete, by Arnold Kling, is “Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade”, or “PSST”, which reminds us of the stickiness of relationships in the economy, the high cost of organizing them, and the high cost of changing them.   I try to use all three of these metaphors depending upon whether I am talking about uncertainty (kaleidic),  costs (PSST), or psychology (flocking and schooling).   However, the term Kaleidic was used by Lachmann to refer to the fact that the economy does not ever fully equilibrate and eliminate all possibility of profit. But it does tend to move toward efficiency that minimizes profit.)

    [G]reat question.

    I use the term ‘Kaleidic’ primarily in the broader sense as “indeterministic”, and less frequently in the narrower sense “never reaching equilibrium” or “never reaching neutrality” in which profits are no longer possible. And in practice I follow Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Arnold Kling more closely than either Shackle or Lachmann in the cause for indeterminism: that shocks are more influential than regularities (Taleb), and that rather than Lachman’s argument, flocking and schooling (in my terms) or more precisely, “Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade” due to changing opportunities rather than ‘mechanical rearranging’, and that informational asymmetry, opportunity costs, transaction costs, are less meaningful. In other words, I see opportunities as more frequent and influential than frictions. This is because the costs of increasing efficiency are often higher than the cost of seizing new opportunities in a dynamic economy. As such, companies ‘sort’ by which tactic they are able to pursue.

    Cost cutting hurts your allies (employees). Which hurts you. And amateur Austrian economists treat human relationships (alliances) as a funglible resource, when, as dynamism increases, people are the most expensive, least predictive, and most influential resource you can possess.


  • Fukuyama Continues His Justification of The Monopoly State

    (Note: I kind of wonder what will happen when people figure out that the difference between Fukuyama/Asian monopoly statism and western polycentrism, is TRUTH TELLING.  Chinese lie and deceive as a matter of course, whereas in the heroic model, we pay the high cost of truth telling as demonstrated contribution to the commons. – Curt Doolittle)

    [F]rancis Fukuyama got hooked on the idea of meritocratic bureaucracy from his study of Chinese history, and in his two most recent books, works to explain the construction of the modern state, by justifying select bureaucracies. His attempt at justifying his priors is approaching the most exasperating work I have read by someone who appears to be honest and merely flawed.

    I value his work, because his comparative analysis, like that of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Pareto, Weber, and more recently Olson, is at least marginally scientific.

    However, when discussing Europe, he identifies then glosses over the most important attributes of european civilization: we developed contract rather than authority. And our ‘priesthood’ (lawyers) and contract (voluntary association) are sufficient for the production of all commons other than defense. He does not address the church-state-commerce balance of powers. Nor the incentives of a bureaucracy.

    Where most of us want to re-nationalize liberalism, and return to the contractual association of man, using law and militia as a means of policing the state, he wants to turn us all into Chinese peasants.

    He doesn’t describe why bureaucracies fail, and seems unaware of the criticism of bureaucracies. He assumes professional bureaucrats will have good interests and be accountable, rather than that such creatures only exist at the margins, and the benefit that they add is less than the damage that they cause AFTER rule of law has been implemented.

    He also ignores Putnam’s illustration of the ills of diversity – and it appears that he does so intentionally.

    So, I have work to do:

    1) demonstrate how the contractual state is superior in every possible way
    2) elaborate on the transaction cost theory of government.
    3) expand the ills of corporatism to that of anti-tribalism

    I cannot work as fast as these other people. I look at some of these guys who put a book out every year or two, and I just work so much more slowly.


  • Fukuyama Continues His Justification of The Monopoly State

    (Note: I kind of wonder what will happen when people figure out that the difference between Fukuyama/Asian monopoly statism and western polycentrism, is TRUTH TELLING.  Chinese lie and deceive as a matter of course, whereas in the heroic model, we pay the high cost of truth telling as demonstrated contribution to the commons. – Curt Doolittle)

    [F]rancis Fukuyama got hooked on the idea of meritocratic bureaucracy from his study of Chinese history, and in his two most recent books, works to explain the construction of the modern state, by justifying select bureaucracies. His attempt at justifying his priors is approaching the most exasperating work I have read by someone who appears to be honest and merely flawed.

    I value his work, because his comparative analysis, like that of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Pareto, Weber, and more recently Olson, is at least marginally scientific.

    However, when discussing Europe, he identifies then glosses over the most important attributes of european civilization: we developed contract rather than authority. And our ‘priesthood’ (lawyers) and contract (voluntary association) are sufficient for the production of all commons other than defense. He does not address the church-state-commerce balance of powers. Nor the incentives of a bureaucracy.

    Where most of us want to re-nationalize liberalism, and return to the contractual association of man, using law and militia as a means of policing the state, he wants to turn us all into Chinese peasants.

    He doesn’t describe why bureaucracies fail, and seems unaware of the criticism of bureaucracies. He assumes professional bureaucrats will have good interests and be accountable, rather than that such creatures only exist at the margins, and the benefit that they add is less than the damage that they cause AFTER rule of law has been implemented.

    He also ignores Putnam’s illustration of the ills of diversity – and it appears that he does so intentionally.

    So, I have work to do:

    1) demonstrate how the contractual state is superior in every possible way
    2) elaborate on the transaction cost theory of government.
    3) expand the ills of corporatism to that of anti-tribalism

    I cannot work as fast as these other people. I look at some of these guys who put a book out every year or two, and I just work so much more slowly.


  • Explaining “Sympathize With Intent”

    CURT: CAN YOU EXPLAIN “SYMPATHIZE WITH INTENT”?

    —“Can you please elaborate on this statement: ‘We know the first principles of human cooperation: we can sympathize with intent.’” —Chris Shaeffer

    [C]hris – Another good question.

    Apes cannot seem to sympathize with intentions to any degree, in the sense that they cannot imagine what we mean by cooperating. The example given is that you can train a monkey to wash dishes but he does not understand the idea of cleaning the plate as an objective, only the experience of playing with water and plate. Dogs however, can understand our intentions. If we point to something they can understand the idea of acting on a subject. We are capable of doing this it appears, from a very young age. And moreover, if we use language to describe a situation another will ‘understand’ our motivations under those conditions. If someone does not understand, we can likewise explore how he or she might not understand and attempt to assist them in forming associations. So we can ‘sympathize’ with other humans. And we are marginally indifferent from one another (at least within our peer groups).

    Conversely, we can also subjectively test theories of incentives: whether an actor subjected to certain stimuli would either be able to make a decision, and which decisions are rational. So we can ‘test’ the first principles of human actions: incentives. And we can do so without the assistance of instrumentation (at least in cases of demonstrated preference – otherwise people are notorious for error, bias and deception). We cannot make the same claim of the physical universe. We cannot ‘intuit’ the universe’s first principles. Although Hawking seems to think we are within a century of discovering them. And should we be able to, we may be able to explain the universe with the same degree of explanation we can apply to economic (human) interactions.

    Mises attempts to express these phenomenon in axiomatic (logical and informationally complete) rather than scientific (theoretical and informationally incomplete) terms. Which is what got him cast out of the discipline and marginalized – rightfully. Despite his other contributions.

    If we see science as the universally accepted language of truthful speech, consisting of a set of warranties we expect each other to provide, rather than as a methodology for determining truth with which to persuade each other, then it is easier to make the argument that it does not matter how one investigates any particular discipline as long as when one publishes it, he does so in the formal language of truthful speech.

    This is, in practice, how the world actually functions. Although we still wrap all our disciplinary language in justificationisms.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    L’viv, Ukraine

  • Explaining “Sympathize With Intent”

    CURT: CAN YOU EXPLAIN “SYMPATHIZE WITH INTENT”?

    —“Can you please elaborate on this statement: ‘We know the first principles of human cooperation: we can sympathize with intent.’” —Chris Shaeffer

    [C]hris – Another good question.

    Apes cannot seem to sympathize with intentions to any degree, in the sense that they cannot imagine what we mean by cooperating. The example given is that you can train a monkey to wash dishes but he does not understand the idea of cleaning the plate as an objective, only the experience of playing with water and plate. Dogs however, can understand our intentions. If we point to something they can understand the idea of acting on a subject. We are capable of doing this it appears, from a very young age. And moreover, if we use language to describe a situation another will ‘understand’ our motivations under those conditions. If someone does not understand, we can likewise explore how he or she might not understand and attempt to assist them in forming associations. So we can ‘sympathize’ with other humans. And we are marginally indifferent from one another (at least within our peer groups).

    Conversely, we can also subjectively test theories of incentives: whether an actor subjected to certain stimuli would either be able to make a decision, and which decisions are rational. So we can ‘test’ the first principles of human actions: incentives. And we can do so without the assistance of instrumentation (at least in cases of demonstrated preference – otherwise people are notorious for error, bias and deception). We cannot make the same claim of the physical universe. We cannot ‘intuit’ the universe’s first principles. Although Hawking seems to think we are within a century of discovering them. And should we be able to, we may be able to explain the universe with the same degree of explanation we can apply to economic (human) interactions.

    Mises attempts to express these phenomenon in axiomatic (logical and informationally complete) rather than scientific (theoretical and informationally incomplete) terms. Which is what got him cast out of the discipline and marginalized – rightfully. Despite his other contributions.

    If we see science as the universally accepted language of truthful speech, consisting of a set of warranties we expect each other to provide, rather than as a methodology for determining truth with which to persuade each other, then it is easier to make the argument that it does not matter how one investigates any particular discipline as long as when one publishes it, he does so in the formal language of truthful speech.

    This is, in practice, how the world actually functions. Although we still wrap all our disciplinary language in justificationisms.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    L’viv, Ukraine

  • A Definition of Economics?

    QUESTION: CURT: WHAT IS YOUR DEFINITION OF ‘ECONOMICS’?” (good piece)

    —“Hi Curt…I can relate to your comments. Perhaps you mentioned it and I missed it, but what in your definition of “Economics”. Is it sociological? A physical science? Something else?”—Lee Roesner

    [L]ee, Great question. Thanks. I think, that the scope of the term Economics is an interesting question, because we can discuss the etymological, normative, technical, and ‘necessary’ properties of the discipline. And by ‘necessary’, those properties that distinguish the discipline from other fields of inquiry. If we look at the etymology, the term evolved from running the household, then the nation, then an abstract discipline that studies the behavior mankind’s production, distribution and trade, chiefly by studying demonstrated preferences recorded as monetary transactions. If we look at how it is practiced, I think that today it is practiced as a social science, and that accusations of ‘economic imperialism’ in social science are probably justified: that economics has evolved into the dominant social science, and that experimental psychology and cognitive science, together have evolved as the dominant individual science. This appears to be the current state of affairs, where experimental psychology and cognitive science focus on our biases and limits, while economics focuses on the effect of those behaviors in the aggregate. And I think that the people in both disciplines expect to meet in the middle with a theory of mankind. (The problem is, that this merely justifies intervention – how to fool people.) Now, I tend to look at disciplines by necessary properties, and I view economics as the study of institutional (both formal and informal) means by which we facilitate human cooperation in pursuit of prosperity. This is traditionally called political economy. So the problem is that if we study it as how we can manipulate man’s biases, I think that is immoral on objective grounds, because it violates the principle of voluntary exchange (imposition of costs). Whereas if we study it as political economy, then we retain the moral constraint that all exchanges must be voluntary. We don’t try to fool people, we try to create transparency – to reduce friction, not to fool them that risk is lower than it appears. This is why I try to stay on message with the statement “Every forced involuntary transfer is a lost opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange.” Because I prefer that economics be constructed and performed as an analysis of moral and voluntary cooperation in the western tradition, rather than an immoral and involuntary analysis in the eastern tradition. And also, because I agree with the Austrian theory of the business cycle: that all attempts to cushion the rate of reorganization of the economy, merely exacerbate the problem by funding the existing (exhausted) order. So, I define economics as the study of morality: the study of the means of human cooperation in pursuit of the production of informal and formal institutions that assist us in cooperating. And as such I see law – the capture of normative constraints on involuntary transfer – as a subset of economics. And in practice I see the purpose of economics as little more than the justification of common, polycentric, organically evolved, law. And I see economics as dependent upon experimental psychology, and cognitive science for the study of man’s actions. This is because these disciplines have proven extremely fruitful in exposing the numerous and extensive limitations to human reason. I think this framing of the disciplines and the scope of the terms, is difficult to argue with – honestly that is. Thanks for the great question. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute L’viv, Ukraine.