HOW DOES YOUR DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW DIFFER FROM LOCKE AND OTHER ENLIGHTENMEN

HOW DOES YOUR DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW DIFFER FROM LOCKE AND OTHER ENLIGHTENMENT THINKERS?

(read me)

—“I have forgotten that your conception, and therefore meaning, of natural law differs extensively from that of Locke and earlier Enlightenment era philosophers.”— Radovan Vyalovich (Радован Вулович )

Great Question. Short answer: Adding Marginalism.

Explanation: It’s not that different from locke other than it’s much more technical, and that locke was part of the era of the labor theory of value and very primitive economics, and very primitive forms of property.

All I have really done is corrected it by adding marginalism/subjective value, and the full scope of demonstrated property, and that required restating it as reciprocity for it to be existentially possible.

Think of it this way: just as the difference between geometry and calculus adds relative positioning to fixed positioning, marginalism adds relative change in property exchanges, to absolute change in individual property.

In other words, under labor theory of value we don’t know if you wasted the world’s resources. Because it isn’t until you conduct a voluntary trade that we have demonstrated evidence and some ability to measure whether you added capital to the world or subtracted from it.

So I guess you could say I’m applying marginalism to natural law.